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Abstract 
The focus of this paper is twofold. First, to explore issues that framed late nineteenth to                
early twentieth century Malay political thinking and the goals political organizations at the time              
had. The paper argues that foreign labor in-migration and British policy played a key role in the                 
economic and social issues that emerged among Malays, but goes further to analyze why some               
parties successfully captured Malay support while others did not. Second, this paper charts two              
different strategies Malay women employed at the time, radical and pragmatic, based on whether              
they directly confront male political superiority or if they utilized it for women's issues. Relying               
primarily on autobiographies by prominent female leaders, the paper presents three case studies             
of women using the strategies mentioned. These women are Khatijah Sidek, Shamsiah Fakeh,             
and Tan Sri Aishah Ghani.  
 
Abstrak 
Kajian ini mengandungi dua tujuan utama. Pertamanya, kajian ini menganalisis isu-isu           
yang membentuk pemikiran politik masyarakat Melayu antara penghujung abad ke-19 dan awal            
abad ke-20. Analisis ini dilakukan bagi mengenalpasti sama ada organisasi-organisasi politik           
pada era tersebut mempunyai objektif yang merangkumi isu-isu tersebut atau tidak, dan            
mengkaji bagaimana parti-parti tersebut berjaya mendapat sokongan masyarakat Melayu. Hasil          
kajian ini mendapati bahawa migrasi buruh luar adalah antara faktor utama dalam isu sosial dan               
ekonomi masyarakat Melayu. Keduanya, kajian ini cuba untuk mengetengahkan dua strategi           
berpolitik kaum wanita pada awal abad kedua puluh, iaitu strategi radikal dan strategi pragmatik.              
Strategi berpolitik ini merujuk kepada kecenderungan mereka untuk secara terang-terangan          
mencabar kuasa patriarki lelaki, atau menggunakan strategi mereka untuk mengetengahkan          
isu-isu kaum wanita pada zaman itu. Menggunakan autobiografi sebagai sumber utama data,            
kajian ini dilaksanakan melalui kajian kes ke atas tiga wanita tersohor atau ikon politik era               
tersebut. Tiga wanita yang dimaksudkan itu ialah Khatijah Sidek, Shamsiah Fakeh, dan Tan Sri              
Aishah Ghani.  
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Glossary 
 
Adat Malay customs. 
British Residency Colonial government system for Federated Malay States 
(FMS) which gave administrative power to a British 
'Resident'. 
Malay Of or pertaining to ethnic Malays. 
Malaya The region of peninsular Malaya. 
Malaysia Country formed in 1963 which includes peninsular Malaya 
and East Malaysia (Borneo states of Sabah and Sarawak). 
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API Angkatan Pemuda Insaf (League of Awakened Youth), Youth wing 
of the PKMM 
AWAS Angkatan Wanita Sedar (League of Awakened Women), Women's 
wing of the PKMM 
BMA British Military Administration, Colonial administration upon 
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CPS Co-Prosperity Sphere 
FMS Federated Malay States 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
HM Hizbul Muslimin, radical Islamist party 
KI Kaum Ibu, the women's wing of UMNO 
KMM Kesatuan Melayu Muda (Union of Young Malays) 
MCP Malayan Communist Party 
MPAJA Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army 
MU Malayan Union 
PAS Pan-Malayan Islamic Party, right-wing Islamist party.  
PKIS Persatuan Kaum Ibu Selangor (Organization of Selangor Women) 
PKMM/MNP Parti Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya (Malay Nationalist Party) 
PMSJ Pergerakan Melayu Semenanjung Johor (Movement of Peninsular 
Malays Johor) 
UMNO United Malays National Organization 
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Introduction 
Malay women contributed greatly to the development of Malaya (later Malaysia) as an             
independent and free country.In fact, the extent of their contribution would come as a shock to             
many, given that Malaysian history books give little space to underline these women's             
contributions. Women's passion for politics was such that to fund their respective parties, women              
from all over the political spectrum would pawn jewelry, knit for fundraising events, and even               
work with their male counterparts to plant rice to feed party members. And that is only to do                  1
with finances, women were also essential to the electoral machinery of UMNO, which they              
helped by canvassing from home to home ensuring voters are registered and have heard of               
UMNO's cause.  
Unfortunately, these contributions did not necessarily translate into more prestigious          
party positions. In fact, chapter 2 discusses how some refused to even increase women's seat               
allocations at party assemblies. This was at a time when women were publicly known to have                
had a swaying role in the general elections. William Roff, the “doyen on studies on Malay                
nationalism” , expressed how male leadership at the time failed "to recognize this importance             2
and to respond with anything like an appropriate number of electoral candidacies, senior party              
posts, and cabinet offices". This paper is a product of my personal query into why women were                 3
not given the political appointments they deserved.  
1 All of these will be elaborated on further in the paper. 
2Aljunied, Syed M. K. “​Against Multiple Hegemonies: Radical Malay Women in Colonial Malaya.​” Journal of 
Social History, vol. 47, no. 1, 2013. p. 141 
3 ​Roff, "​Review of Government and Politics​," p. 928 
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This paper has two objectives. First, it is to understand the socioeconomic condition             
under British and later Japanese colonialism and how these conditions contributed to the Malay              
sense of anxiety at the time. This anxiety provided a launching point for political groups at the                 
time as they attempted to capture this alienation to further their political objectives. Primarily,              
this anxiety was driven by the feeling of marginalization among Malays due to being largely               
excluded from the economic changes happening around them. The increasing British           
encroachment on Malay states was another factor.  
Malay women experienced the same economic and political changes, but to add to that,              
there were additional barriers against upward economic and political mobility. From the            
economic perspective, daughters were typically not prioritized in education and this had a lot to               
do with the expectations of women. Marrying off daughters in their early teens was common and                
this, along with social stigma, further discouraged women's education. From the political            
perspective, women were never given the acknowledgement they deserved. As we shall see,             
there was a clear mismatch between how important women were to their political party's              
operations and how many women were ​actually ​appointed to various party positions. This had              
much to do with their male counterparts holding women members back from higher positions              
within their parties. Given this undeniable male dominance in party politics, women had very              
few ways to maneuver politically.  
The second objective of this paper is then to elucidate the political strategies that emerged               
among women in Malaya in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries given these barriers.               
Politics was defined by men and political power was in their hands. Importantly, as we shall see,                 
masculinity as power was important to these men. This tension was dealt with in different ways                
 
11 
by different women, with some opting to openly challenge masculine authority and others             
attempting to utilize it to advance women's issues. I argue that these dominant strategies can be                
grouped into two: pragmatic, where the masculine authority is utilized to further the women's              
cause; and radical strategy, where the women directly confront and agitate the masculine             
authority. Explaining this strategy can be complicated when one realizes that many of these              
women went to the same schools and often were together in some early political organizations.  
To achieve this second objective, this paper will draw from the autobiographies of three              
women: Khatijah Sidek, Tan Sri Aishah Ghani, and Shamsiah Fakeh. I have chosen these three               
because analyzing them collectively informs us greatly about the kinds of barriers men presented              
to women and how they navigated these barriers with their respective strategies.  
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 Chapter 1: Demographic and Socioeconomic Changes in 
Peninsular Malaya 1874-1941 
Introduction 
Before attempting to grapple with the several issues related to Malay women in politics, I               
will introduce the reader to the key demographic and socioeconomic changes in Malaya during              
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. There is little scholarly discourse about             
gender-specific issues brought about by socioeconomic changes at the time. This lack of             
scholarship should not be taken as an indication that there was little gendered effect on society at                 
the time, but as an indication of the limited scope of research. This was likely due to women’s                  
general illiteracy among all races in Malaya in between the 1870s and the 1920s, though this                
might be a separate area of study itself. The resources that scholars do have access to, however,                 
are mainly primary documents (memoirs, letters) and interviews with women reflecting on their             
childhoods in the the early twentieth century. Scholars like Dancz and Manderson rely on the               
latter to fill in gaps in their research. For scholars today, this would be a problem, not just                  4
because most the leaders at the time are deceased, but also because even if they were not,                 
memory of events from six decades ago may be unreliable. Therefore, for the purposes of this                
study, I will rely primarily on sources like Dancz and Manderson’s various interviews with these               
4 ​Dancz, Virginia H. ​Women and Party Politics in Peninsular Malaysia​. Oxford University Press, 1987. 
Manderson, Lenore. ​Women, Politics and Change: the Kaum Ibu UMNO, Malaysia: 1945-1972​. Oxford University 
Press, 1980. 
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women and memoirs they wrote during their lifetimes. These sources will be used heavily              
especially in the second and third chapters.  
Before going into the political groups that emerged out of Malay political and economic              
marginalization, I will analyze ​Adat and its relation to Islam to reveal the male dominance that                
emerges. I will lay out a few important themes. Firstly, as we shall see, Malays were feeling left                  
out of Malaya’s then-young capitalist economy. This was primarily driven by British policy,             
which on the one hand intentionally separated different races into economic niches with Malays              
in the rural countryside, and on the other hand intensified Chinese and Indian immigration as a                
means of cheap labor. Secondly, Malays also felt betrayed by the British implementation of the               
Malayan Union, which I will discuss in detail in chapter 2.  
In this chapter, I will also discuss British political encroachment on the Malay states. I               
will start, as scholars often do, with the event that began the period of British direct rule over a                   
Malay state: the 1874 Pangkor Agreement. I will use this as a case study of the British advance                  
and as an example of how the British were initially received in several Malay states. Having laid                 
down the political and social changes during that period, I will then focus on the economic                
changes occurring in Malaya at the time. Taken together, these changes created a deep feeling of                
marginalization among Malays. The Kaum Muda, or Young Bloc, will then be used as an               
example of an early form of Malay political organization that tried to capture this alienation. I                
will delve into their emphasis on women’s education, using novels and newspaper opinion pieces              
to analyze their motives and whether they were successful in their mission. 
 
Malay ​Adat, ​Islam, and the ‘Place’ of Malay Women 
 
14 
Beginning examining economic and political changes in the period, it is important to             
discuss social features of Malay life. Not only did these structures persist, but they enforced a                
framework both men and women had to abide by. This discussion will largely center around               
Adat ​and Islam's role in Malay life, but also the role that colonial observers had in producing this                  
knowledge. 
The Malaysian constitution, drafted by the Reid and Cobbold Commissions prior to            5
Malaysia’s 1957 independence, defines Malays as those who (1) Speak the Malay language, (2)              
are of the Muslim faith, and (3) practice Malay customs, or ​Adat​. This definition is likely                
inherited from the British, as Roff notes. Shamsul further argues that all recent ideas about               6
‘Malayness’ were constructed under the “hegemony of colonial knowledge”. His argument is            7
that the contemporary idea that Malayness consists of three ‘pillars’ of ​Raja, Bahasa, Agama              
(King, Language, Religion) was actually constructed using that ‘colonial knowledge’ which           
Wagoner defines as “forms and bodies of knowledge that enabled European colonizers to             
achieve domination over their colonized subjects around the globe”. According to Shamsul, the             8
historical resources available on both the colonial and pre-colonial periods indicate a change in              
definition of Malayness between those periods. This is mainly after Stamford Raffles, the             
founder of British Singapore, penned an essay called 'On the Malayu Nation, with a Translation               
of its Maritime Institution': 
5 ​The Reid and Cobbold Commissions produced suggestions for the Malayan Constitution in 1956 and 1957.  
6 Roff, William R. ​The Origins of Malay Nationalism​. Oxford U.P., 1967. 
7Shamsul A.B “A History of an Identity, an Identity of a History: The Idea and Practice of ‘Malayness’ in Malaysia 
Reconsidered.” ​Journal of Southeast Asian Studies​, vol. 32, no. 03, Oct. 2001 
8 ​Wagoner, Phillip B. “Precolonial Intellectuals and the Production of Colonial Knowledge.” ​Comparative Studies in 
Society and History​, vol. 45, no. 04, 2003 
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“Raffles’ essay set the tone for the subsequent discourse on Malay and Malayness             
amongst the Europeans - and, later, amongst the Malays themselves. Raffles wrote: I cannot but               
consider the Malayu [sic] nation as one people, speaking one language, though spread over so               
wide a space, preserving their character and customs, in all the maritime states lying between               
Sulu Seas and the Southern Oceans.'” This essay was the most significant example of Western               9
knowledge production vis-a-vis ‘Malayness’. In the pre-colonial era, Dutch and Portuguese           
merchants would write “detailed inventory lists of people and things”, where they classified             
people according to local labels, like Malay, Javanese, and Balinese, and “made no conscious              
attempt to reconstitute or redefine labels”. This is in contrast to Raffles’ essay which collapsed               10
all Malay (and plenty non-Malay) identities into one ‘Malay nation’.  
Bearing this in mind, I will move forward with care not to confuse ​adat ​with Islam or                 
with Malayness, treating these notions as separate but often complementary. I will use these two               
aspects of Malayness not because I deem them as ‘pillars’ in Malay identity, but because               
analyzing them will reveal several issues pertinent to the discussion on Malay women’s politics.  
Translating ​adat ​is difficult, as it incorporates everything from “good manners” such as             
bowing your head when walking in front of an older person, to things as complex as the                 
hierarchy of political power and rules on inheritance. I will therefore not use a translated term for                 
adat​, though I would argue that it can be described as a group of fluid norms that dictate several                   
aspects in Malay life, from essential to superficial.  
There are two subgroups of ​Adat​: ​Adat Temenggong ​and ​Adat Perpateh​. They both             
originate from modern-day Indonesia, and most likely from Sumatra, to be specific. To list the               
9 ​Shamsul, 363 
10 Ibid, 362 
 
16 
differences between them would exceed the limits of this paper. I will, however, delve into the                
broadest distinctions between the two. One aspect is in inheritance, where ​Adat Perpateh ​is              
matrilineal, meaning that inheritance runs through the mother's side, while ​Adat Temenggong ​is             
patrilineal, similar to inheritance in most of the West and Middle East. The matrilineality of ​Adat                
Perpateh ​will be discussed later in this paper. In terms of practice, ​Adat Temenggong ​is more                
widely used, while ​Adat Perpateh ​is used more common in the Malay state of Negeri Sembilan.                
This has to do with the origin of migrants in the state. Since Negeri Sembilan was populated                 
mainly by settlers of Minangkabau descent, it makes sense that ​Adat Perpateh ​be more common               
in Negeri Sembilan, as ​Adat Perpateh ​originated from the Minangkabau people.  
The two subgroups share much in common. One such aspect is that gender plays an               
important role in society, particularly in raising one’s child. Both groups of ​Adat go into the                
details of how children are to be brought up, as it “defined the socialization of children to include                  
the everyday skills they should necessarily be taught”. Gender was at the center of this               
“socialization”. For young boys, they are to learn masculine skills, typically tasks that their              
fathers had been doing like fishing and ​Silat​, the Malay form of martial arts which combines                
elegant movement with animistic mysticism. Young girls, on the other hand, would learn to be a                
part of the domestic household from early on in their lives. They would pick up skills from their                  
mothers and would lead a very guarded lifestyle. Young women were often referred to as ‘​anak                
dara’​, which literally means virgin child. The phrase idealizes (sexually) pure young unmarried             
women who rarely left the house and who never interacted with strange men. As a result,                
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children received gendered education based on ​Adat​, “thus the young boy learned to sail and               
fight, the sister to weave and sew”.   11
As a justification of male superiority over women, ​Adat ​was not the only thing utilized.               
By the mid-19th century, Islam had already been visible in the Malay peninsula for over a                
millennium through early Arab traders. The first Malay Sultan to convert to Islam was likely a                
Kedahan Sultan who did so in the 12th century, Maharaja Derbar Raja II, who changed his name                 
to Sultan Muzaffar Shah. By the 15th century, all Malay Sultans - and probably the majority of                 12
Malay peasants, who followed their leader - had at least begun infusing Islam into their animistic                
and Hindu traditions. When Western colonizers arrived in the region, they arrived at a time when                
they felt they could comfortably say that Islam, to Malays, was an “ethnic identifier”. This is                13
not to say that Adat was ever "Islamicized", the two remained distinct and the terms are not                 
interchangeable. In fact, in Raffles' accounts of Malay culture, he writes plenty about how              
distinct ​adat ​and Islam were, and how this often created legal ambiguity due to the fact that                 
people could switch between the two systems when a dispute arose. He saw this legal ambiguity                
as a reason for Malay exposure to "capricious rule and insecurity of person and property".   14
What is important in our discussion is that Islam was complementary with ​Adat ​in its               
prescription of gendered upbringings for children. Many verses in the Quran are used to entrench               
male dominance over the wife in the household. An example of a verse often quoted to signal                 
unquestionable male superiority can be found in Surah An-Nisa: 
11 Manderson, 16 
12 Hassan, Sharifah Zaleha Binte Syed. “History and the Indigenization of the Arabs in Kedah, Malaysia.” ​Asian 
Journal of Social Science​, vol. 32, no. 3, 2004, p. 404 
13 ​Shamsul, 355 
14 Rahman, Noor Aisha Abdul. ​Colonial Image of Malay Adat Laws a Critical Appraisal of Studies on Adat Laws in 
the Malay Peninsula during the Colonial Era and Some Continuities​. Brill, 2006., p. 21 
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“Men are in charge of women by [right of] what Allah has given one over the other and                  
what they spend [for maintenance] from their wealth. So righteous women are devoutly obedient,              
guarding in [the husband's] absence what Allah would have them guard” Quran [4:34]  15
Compare that with the ​Adat Perpateh ​saying: 
The ​Raja ​rules his country,  
The ​Penghulu ​rules his province, 
The ​Lembaga​ rules his tribe,  
The ​Buapak​ rules his people and 
The husband leads his wife.   16
Importantly, politics and the household go hand in hand. The political hierarchy does not              
stop at the ‘private’ space of the household, but goes further to establish a hierarchy within that                 
household. Male leadership was to be established in all areas of the ‘political’. While ​Adat               
Perpateh ​was matrilineal and accorded significant influence to women, the husband was still             
viewed as the ​‘Ketua’ ​or leader. To be sure, it is known that husbands often consulted their wives                  
before making family decisions and wives played an important part in the household. However,              
these were subject to the husband's desire to do so. If a husband did not, the wife would have                   
little freedom or security in the marriage.  
Another area where men had a significant advantage over their wives was in divorce.              
Under interpretations by religious leaders, Malaysian Sharia law only requires men to utter the              
phrase “I divorce you” to officially divorce their wife, though details are to be arranged in later                 
15 The quoted verse is line 34 from the 4th Surah in the Quran.  
16 Translated by Lenore Manderson, 1980, except the last sentence. I have used 'lead' instead of 'ruled' as a 
translation of the last sentence because 'ruled' in that sentence would have too much of a negative connotation in 
English. 
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discussions with respective families. Women, on the other hand, had to provide a substantial              
level of evidence of a husband's wrongdoing in order for a court to approve a divorce if the                  
husband was unwilling to divorce her. The wife could also pay a small fee if the husband were                  
willing to divorce her. This process is called ​Khulu’. ​There are, of course, details I do not wish to                   
delve into, but it is difficult to deny that Malay men had far more personal security in marriages                  
than did Malay women.  
Malay women's knowledge about ​Adat​, sometimes through personal experience, would          
inform their political goals. Changing the expectations placed on women, increasing female            
literacy, and economically empowering women were among the common strands of political            
activism among women. All of these issues, along with the legal insecurity in marriage, would               
play a significant role in Malay women's political goals, as we shall see in chapters 2 and 3.  
 
British Direct Rule in Malaya and Malay Reactions 1874-1890 
Scholars generally agree Malay nationalism only started to gain a wide audience and             
appeal in the 1920s. What this situation meant for Malay women is that, unfortunately, before               17
the shifts that allowed women to receive an education occurred, women had little involvement in               
activities that were needed to be part of the popular discourse on Malay nationalism. However,               18
if we were to completely leave out the discussion on Malay nationalism’s development just              
because of our emphasis on women’s contributions to the field, we would miss out on several                
extremely important changes that deeply affected both Malay men and women. This section will              
17Arifin, Azmi. “The Historiography of Malay Nationalism.” ​Kajian Malaysia​, vol. 32, no. 1, 2014. 
18 As we shall eventually see, Malay women did actually engage in several private activities that included repetitive 
reading and writing.  
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detail the Malay anxieties entering the twentieth century and how those anxieties influenced             
popular discourse and in changes in communal leadership.  
The reason for this sense of alienation was that Malays increasingly felt excluded from              
the young capitalist economy burgeoning all around them. Economic changes, along with            
demographic shifts and unavoidable global trends all unfortunately contributed to the Malay            
anxiety. To be sure, Malay-British contacts predated the late nineteenth century. In 1786, Francis              
Light set up a British colony in Pulau Pinang, Stamford Raffles and William Farquhar              
established Singapore as a colony in 1824 and James Brooke ruled over in Borneo as the 'White                 
Rajah' from 1842. If we discuss Europeans as a whole, the Portuguese invaded Malacca as early                
as 1511. I raise these cases as indications that Malays were familiar with Europeans and their                
military and naval might for centuries. Economic changes were already beginning to take place,              
but it was after direct rule that natural resources began to go directly to the colonialists and                 
political changes started accelerating. The subsequent period of antagonism against British direct            
rule can be seen as a culmination of several generations of anger at European conquest and                
domination.  
Beginning in 1874, Malays saw the power of the Sultanate, an institution to which they               
had been loyal for generations, erode significantly. While the British had already agreed with the               
Dutch in 1824 to officially designate areas of influence in the Malayan Archipelago, the 1874               
Pangkor Agreement saw the first official maneuver by the British to gain direct control over a                
Malay state, in this case the state of Perak. Perak is illustrative not only because it was the first                   
case of British direct rule, but also because similar reactions to changes brought by the British                
could be seen in different Malay states.  
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Taking advantage of a succession dispute between two princes, the British backed Raja             
Muda Abdullah who eventually took the throne. The British were rewarded for their help with               19
the installation of the first ever British ‘Resident’ in the state. On paper, the Resident would be                 
consulted for all decisions other than those relating to religion and Malay customs. According to               
Sultan Nazrin, the current Sultan of Perak as of early 2018, “The Pangkor Treaty provided for                
the appointment of a British Resident to ​advise ​the Sultan of Perak in all matters affecting the                 
general administration, including maintaining the peace and security, overseeing the collection of            
revenue from taxation and encouraging economic development” . The Resident's advice could,           20
however, circumvent a Sultan's disapproval. In short, the Resident had displaced all institutions             
that provided the Sultan his power, apart from the Sultanate itself which retained symbolic value.  
J.W.W Birch, then Perak's Resident, is still infamous among Malays, with the site of his               
assassination turned into a museum. The assassination was prompted after Birch decided to             21
intervene in Perak’s practice of slavery. He was known " he openly encouraged debt-slaves to               22
abscond, he sheltered runaway slaves, and gave female slaves in marriage without the permission              
of their master." This act was seen as a violation of the agreement between the British and the                  23
Sultan due to the fact that many saw slavery as part of ​Adat ​at the time, with which the Resident                    
agreed he would not interfere. Given that the size of a Sultan's retinue, he greatly despised Birch                 
after that. Even so, while this issue was important, interference with slavery was unlikely to be                
19 In Perak’s system of succession, “Raja Muda” is the title given to the crown prince, which may be, but is not 
necessarily, the eldest son of the reigning Sultan.  
20Shah, Nazrin. ​Charting the Economy: Early 20th Century Malaya and Contemporary Malaysian Contrasts​. Oxford 
University Press, 2017: 21. Emphasis mine. 
21 For more information, visit the website for Pasir Salak Historical Complex at 
http://www.malaysia.travel/en/tr/places/states-of-malaysia/perak/pasir-salak-historical-complex  
22 For more on Perak's slavery, read Hussin, Iza. “The Pursuit of the Perak Regalia: Islam, Law, and the Politics of 
Authority in the Colonial State.” Law & Social Inquiry, vol. 32, no. 3, 2007, pp. 759–788. 
23 ​Hussin, p. 772-773. 
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the main cause of the assassination and was instead a trigger for the increasingly marginalized               
people livid at these new arrangements. For example, Birch had also taken away the Perak Malay                
elite's rights to collect taxes, claiming sole rights for himself and instead provided the elites with                
wages from state coffers. Importantly, Sultan Abdullah, who was originally backed by the             
British, egged his followers on after seeing his power encroached upon.  
Immediately after the assassination of Birch, the British executed several of the Malay             
leaders involved in the murder and exiled Sultan Abdullah to the Seychelles. A later product of                
the assassination was the beginning of the Perak War between locals and British troops, the               
result of which saw the British further extend their influence and power over Perak’s institutions.               
The case of Perak was one of four instances of the British gaining direct rule over Malay states.                  
The other three were Selangor, Pahang, and Negeri Sembilan - all rich in tin - which, along with                  
Perak, would go on to be known in 1895 as the ‘Federated Malay States’ (FMS), each with a                  
British Resident in control of executive decisions. The period between 1870 to 1910 would see               
several relatively small rebellions break out against the British. Rebellions broke out in most              
states, even those not under direct rule, and scholars are still trying to map the extent of those                  
disturbances.  
To be sure, violence against the British should not be viewed as an example of any sort of                  
wider, united Malay political action against the British. The trigger in each state may have been                
different and each rebellion needs to be analyzed on its own terms. As Azmi Ariffin notes, both                 
Roff and Soenarno argue that revolts by Malays before the twentieth century were part of “a                
series of revolts driven by self-interest and fanaticism and as the results of “feudalistic              
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uprisings.”” While the triggers may have differed, it is clear that the extent of British control                24
was disruptive across state lines.  
 
 
 
Malaya's Burgeoning Capitalism: 1874-1920 
In the economic sphere, the late nineteenth century saw the intensification of capitalism             
and the further marginalization of Malay people. Khoo argues that there were two industries in               
particular that changed rapidly during this period: tin mining and commercial agriculture. On a              25
global scale, mass changes to food storage in tin cans during times of war added the impetus to                  
this industry’s growth, especially for the Crimean War, the Franco-Prussian War, and the             
American Civil War. It did not take much time for entrepreneurs to figure out that Malaya had                 
tin in abundance. ‘Straits Chinese’ or Chinese merchants living in the states adjacent to the               
Malaccan Straits, invested heavily in capital, mining technology, and in bringing migrant            
laborers from China to work in the tin mines. Even the Malay rulers played a part in this trend.                   
Instead of urging Straits Chinese to utilize Malay residents for the bulk of their labor needs and                 
therefore increasing wages of locals, the rulers allowed this change because of the slight              
technological edge the Chinese had over the Malays’ more traditional mining method. The             26
migration was pursued to the point that Malays were literally a minority in their own land, as was                  
noted in the introduction. The tin mining and production industries were booming and by the               
start of the 20th century, ‘Straits Tin’ would be the world’s main supply of the commodity. “By                 
24 Arifin, Azmi. “The Historiography of Malay Nationalism.” ​Kajian Malaysia​, vol. 32, no. 1, 2014. p. 5 
25 Kim, Khoo K. “Tradition and Modernity in Malay Society (1830s-1930s).” ​Intellectual Discourse​, 2011, p. 15–40 
26 Ibid, 19. Malays were using a method called ​lampan​, which involved sifting mud and silt for tin. 
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1904, Malaya was producing 50,000 tons of tin annually, more than half of world output.” The                27
British sought to dominate the tin industry, and did so successfully by 1931, when the British                
controlled 65% of tin production, in comparison to 1912 when 80% was controlled by Straits               
Chinese.   28
In commercial agriculture, similar trends can be seen. Chinese and European merchants            
and entrepreneurs already experimented with commercial agriculture in the mid-nineteenth          
century, while Malays were still predominantly subsistence farming. Sugar and pepper were            
among the main commercial crops grown at the time. This would change beginning in 1896,               
when the Tan Chay Can, a Chinese merchant in Malacca, tried planting rubber. Over the next                
few decades, rubber would surpass even tin as Malaya’s main export, supplying the majority of               
the world’s natural rubber. Again, this intensification of the capitalist economy was due to              29
extremely profitable global prices of rubber, buoyed mainly by skyrocketing demand for tires for              
newly-commercialized automobiles and electronic goods.  
It is clear, therefore, that the intensification of capitalism by Chinese merchants and the              
British did little to enrich local Malays. The majority of Malays were still predominantly stuck in                
rural-based farming, while all around them economic, demographic and political structures           
changed rapidly. The marginalization of Malay peoples is described by Khoo when he argues,              
“more up-to-date technology - first steamships and then the railway - allowed British agency              
houses in Singapore and the Chinese middlemen to render almost irrelevant the services of the               
Malays themselves.” The Chinese in-migration and subsequent economic domination, pushed          30
27Shah, Nazrin. ​Charting the Economy: Early 20th Century Malaya and Contemporary Malaysian Contrasts​. Oxford 
University Press, 2017. p. 29 
28 ​Ibid, 30  
29 ​Ibid, 31 
30Kim, Khoo K. “Tradition and Modernity in Malay Society (1830s-1930s).” ​Intellectual Discourse​, 2011, pp. 15–40 
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heavily by the British with approval from Malay monarchs, was a heavy burden to bear for                
Malays.  
One might wonder how and why the state Sultans could allow this degree of migration.               
The entire reason boils down to the complex relationship between Sultans and the British. The               
British were always greatly admired for their riches and weaponry. While this mainly applied to               
the British, it is possible that the admiration spilled over to other European nations. Take the                
accounts of Sultan Abu Bakar of Johor's visit to England in 1866, which illustrates the degree of                 
friendliness between colonizer and colonized: 
"On 14 May, they were granted an audience by Queen Victoria at Buckingham Palace.              
[Historian J.M.] Gullick also states that Abu Bakar had the opportunity to meet the              
mayors of English cities and sought an introduction to the French Emperor, Napoleon             
III. [Historian R.O.] Winstedt pointed out that Abu Bakar kissed the Queen’s hand             
during the visit and sent Manila cheroots as a gift to the Prince of Wales"   31
 
To be sure, Abu Bakar's relationship with Victoria was unique, especially in that the              
latter awarded Abu Bakar with ​the Knight Commander of the Order of the Star of India (KCSI)                 
before his visit​. However, to illustrate how widespread this admiration was, just three years              32
after Abu Bakar's visit, the Sultan of Terengganu "sent a request to the Governor" indicating his                
interest to send an envoy to England. This attitude was the common relationship between the               33
British and the Malay Sultans. Bearing in mind that subjects gave their absolute loyalty to the                
31 Abdullah, A. Rahman Tang. “Sultan Abu Bakar's Foreign Guests and Travels Abroad, 1860sâ​​1895: Fact and 
Fiction in Early Malay Historical Accounts.” ​Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society​, vol. 84, 
no. 1, 2011, p. 5. 
32Ibid, 3 
33 ​Ibid, 5 
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Sultan, it is easy to see how Malay rulers at the time could ignore or not have known about the                    
situation most other Malays were facing. While their Sultans were busy presenting gifts to the               
British, general Malay anxiety over declining prospects became ever more prevalent and would             
shape a significant part of the their political psyche in years to come. 
 
Malay Sensitization to Global Events and the Kaum Muda- Kaum Tua Divide 
The Great Depression would then see all communities in the peninsula suffer heavy             
economic losses. Both Aljunied and Sultan Nazrin go into detail about the impact the Great               
Depression had on Malays, the former focusing on how it shaped political will in relation to                
‘foreign’ races, while the latter on its impact on Malayan exports and GDP. The economic               
effects of the Great Depression in Malaya were dire. Mass layoffs in the tin and rubber industries                 
were followed by repatriation of large groups of immigrants (particularly Indian laborers).            34
Sultan Nazrin attributes the large losses in the two main industries to the Malayan economy’s               
“direct” link to that of the US, to whom companies in Malaya exported their rubber for Ford cars                  
and tin for canned food products. For the purposes of this paper, the effects on Malay politics                 35
are even more relevant. While Malays were largely excluded from the industries worst hit by the                
depression, they felt its impact nonetheless. The biggest insecurity Malays felt was regarding             
loss of land and business. Given their declining prospects, many Malays sold their land and               
businesses to the Chinese who had saved enough pre-Depression. This was seen in both rural and                
urban areas.   36
34 ​Repatriation was done with colonial funding which also diminished spending in other sectors. For more, see 
Nazrin Shah's section on the Great Depression.  
35 Nazrin Shah, 113 
36 Aljunied (2015), 40 
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Aljunied, in a section he aptly titled “The Great (Malay) Depression”, analyzes how the              
Depression shaped Malay thinking at the time. Citing entries to local papers Saudara, Majlis and               
Majalah Guru , he argues that the Great Depression “sensitized Malays to their marginal place              37
in the British Empire.” The Great Depression forced Malays to see that they were (a minute)                38
part of global trends. In the several years of discussion regarding the condition Malays found               
themselves in, Malays were also beginning to shape notions of race-based nationalism.  
As is often the case, any analysis of this period in Malaya that did not consider the                 
debates between the ​Kaum Muda and ​Kaum Tua would make it incomplete. Contextually, the              
phrases can be translated to Young Bloc and the Old Bloc respectively. Among scholars, there               
are some debates about how to describe the two groups. Roff described the ​Kaum Muda as                
Islamic reformists and the ​Kaum Tua as the “traditional elite” and rural religious hierarchy.              39
Thompson described the ​Kaum Muda ​as “a party of about a hundred young Malays from the                
nascent middle class who attempted to progress along Western lines.” Mahani Musa described             
the ​Kaum Muda more simply as “modernists” and the Kaum Tua as “conservatives” while              40
Aljunied followed up his definitions with the argument that the ​Kaum Muda was also responsible               
for several groups considered offshoots from themselves, such as the radical left-wing Kesatuan             
Melayu Muda (KMM), or Union of Young Malays. As most of these scholars themselves have               41
found, it is quite difficult to attribute one specific ideology to either side. Though the general                
37 As we shall see later, newspapers were the main medium of discourse regarding Malay political issues. 
38Aljunied, Syed Muhd. Khairudin.​ Radicals: Resistance and Protest in Colonial Malaya​. Northern Illinois 
University Press, 2015. 
39Roff, William R. ​The Origins of Malay Nationalism​. Oxford U.P., 1967. 
40Musa, Mahani. “​The Woman Question​​ In Malayan Periodicals​.” Indonesia and the Malay World, vol. 38, no. 111, 
2010, pp. 247–271., doi:10.1080/13639811.2010.489360. 
41 Aljunied (2015): 63 
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view that the ​Kaum Muda were reformists and the ​Kaum Tua ​were staunch traditionalists is               
generally popular, these categorizations leave out several important nuances. 
The Kaum Muda were a loose group of relatively young reform-minded individuals often             
educated in the Middle East, mostly in Alexandria, Egypt. Their education was central to their               
ideology. They argued against several traits of Malays that they felt were ‘backward’ and their               
focus from the very beginning of the establishment of their first paper, Al-Imam, was on               
religious backwardness specifically. They derided the “backwardness of the Malays, their           
domination by alien races, their laziness, their complacency, their bickering among themselves,            
and their inability to cooperate for the common good.” We can read their analysis with the                42
widespread but separate rebellions against the British in mind. The ​Kaum Muda emphasized the              
need for united Malay action, though they never explicitly mentioned this. This is likely because               
the 'Malay' identity was still very loose and had several intra-ethnic differences that were still               
important, such as geography and heritage. There was also still tension regarding how wide the               
Malay net should be cast. Should the (what would later be known as) Indonesian Malays be a                 
part of this movement? What of the Javanese share some customs but have their own language?                
These pertinent questions would require time and experimentation and the ​Kaum Muda were too              
new and too short-lived to answer them. 
Importantly, while their focus was on Malays, al-Imam pieces often focused on Islam and              
Muslims as a whole. For example, they criticized the religious Ulama for encouraging ​taklid              
buta​, or blind adherence to religious rulings, and they pushed for Malay women’s education.              
While the ​Kaum Muda​’s religious-reform-minded ideology would gain more traction in future            
42 Roff (1967): 57 
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years (especially their emphasis on girls’ education), they were not, however, in the ideological              
mainstream, which the ​Kaum Tua ​still dominated. Roff retells the story of how even the most                
influential religious scholar among the ​Kaum Muda​, Shaykh Tahir, came very close to being              
appointed Mufti (religious leader and arbiter of state religious rulings) of Johor, but was rejected               
by the state’s Sultan. This points to the fact that the ​Kaum Muda enjoyed little success getting                 43
their “modernist” ideologies into that mainstream of Malay Muslim thought.  
The ​Kaum Tua viewed the ​Kaum Muda​’s ideologies as a threat to their order, often                
utilizing their authority and political power to their advantage. Laws were introduced to             
monopolize the dissemination of religious information into their hands only. For example, fatwa             
(religious rulings) were issued declaring new ideas as heretic and ​Kaum Muda publications were              
banned from some states.   44
 
Women’s Education and Masculine Tension 
The ​Kaum Muda-Kaum Tua disagreements with which we are concerned focused on            
women’s education. In this section, I will analyze the reasons for supporting or opposing              
women's education at the time and how this problem became an issue for male discussion. This                
section further underlines my thesis of politics being the male domain and all discussions of               
female participation being made in relation to masculinity. 
Historically, scholars have argued that Malay women in the nineteenth century were            
often equipped with the ability to read and write in ​Jawi ​script, a Malay form of writing adapted                  
from the Arabic alphabet. In terms of the writing of manuscripts, Malay women “read, copied               
43 ​Roff (1967), 75 
44 Ibid, 80 
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and indeed composed their own texts. They were both patrons and hirers of manuscripts.” But               45
this should not lead to the conclusion that women were literate or educated. While reading may                
have been more visible among the elite, there was generally a stigma against women's literacy.               
Andaya also argues that we cannot describe reading and writing in this context as being educated                
because the reading and writing allowed for women at the time was from memory and for                
specific purposes. She argues that for many cases in Southeast Asia, ""reading" is more properly               
seen as memorized recitation, revealing much of culturally appropriate emotions but little of             
individual interiority.”  46
Women's education would be a cause for opposition for a lot of Malays in the beginning                
of the twentieth century. There is no mention of the possibility that the women’s education being                
pushed by the ​Kaum Muda ​continued the traditional and formulaic forms of writing. Perhaps the               
fact that the ​Kaum Muda ​never even attempted to draw traditional and historic ties to their cause                 
is a signal of their elitism, a view that many Malays had at the time and one of the many reasons                     
the ​Kaum Muda ​did not take off politically. Criticism against the ​Kaum Muda needs to be                
tempered with the understanding that this small group of ambitious reformers was the first of its                
kind, and had few, if any, domestic political predecessors to draw inspiration or strategies from. 
Through al-Imam, the ​Kaum Muda “championed property rights for women and           
criticized polygamy but cautiously supported women’s education.” Syed Shaykh al-Hadi, who           47
Musa argues was “influenced by the feminist movements in Egypt and Turkey,” designated a              
45 Hijjas, Mulaika. “Not Just Fryers of Bananas and Sweet Potatoes: Literate and Literary Women in the 
Nineteenth-Century Malay World.” ​Journal of Southeast Asian Studies​, vol. 41, no. 01, 2009: 172 
46 Andaya, Barbara Watson. ​Flaming Womb: Repositioning Women in Early Modern Southeast Asia​. University of 
Hawaii Press, 2006, p. 53-54 
47Musa, Mahani. “​The Woman Question In Malayan Periodicals​.” Indonesia and the Malay World, vol. 38, no. 111, 
2010, p. 249 
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whole section of the newspaper Al-Ikhwan to the discussion of women’s issues. For the most               48
part, Malay parents were beginning to see the benefits of education, as the British set up more                 
and more institutions that required the hiring of natives to positions of low-level administrators              
and public servants. Jobs like teachers, police officers, and other office jobs, while low in the                
hierarchy of government, provided salaries unlike any income from traditional economic           
activities Malays had typically experienced. Parents, likely those informed by the discourse on             
women’s education in periodicals or by stories from their friends and family, were among those               
pushing for their daughters to be schooled. Musa notes that the government of the state of Kedah                 
received “no fewer than 589 applications from parents to have their daughters admitted to the 42                
boys’ schools in the state” in January 1934.   49
While the discourse early on typically focused on male responses to women’s education,             
the 1920s and 30s saw several Malay women joining in. What is interesting, however, is that                
although women across the board agreed that women's’ education was important, they held             
different views as to why it was so. A huge concern of women (and especially men) was the                  
influence that western culture might have on women should they receive an education. In reading               
the Kaum Muda’s ​contribution to women’s education, though being the first to discuss women’s              
education to a wide audience, we should be cautious in any attempt to describe them as feminist                 
or progressive in their outlook. A major reason to be cautious here is that the ​Kaum Muda​, in                  
demanding women and girls to be educated, while perhaps slightly concerned about Malay             
female illiteracy, were probably far more concerned with the increasing number of educated             
Chinese people in Malaya during that period. Chinese residents, some just migrated to Malaya              
48 Ibid, 249 
49 Ibid, 251 
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and others having lived in the peninsula for a generation or two, had already started to forge their                  
own communities. Vernacular education was of particular political and social interest to the             
Chinese. They felt that the only way to preserve their culture and to avoid assimilation was to                 
start education early, and importantly, regardless of gender. By 1938, there were 996 Chinese              
schools in Malaya with a total student enrolment of 86,147, compared to 788 Malay schools with                
56,904 students.” Gender-specific numbers are difficult to come by, but the speed at which the               50
Chinese immigrants opened schools and educated their young in comparison to the Malays must              
have been a concern for the ​Kaum Muda​. By this time, Straits Chinese parents had already                
concluded that they needed their young girls to be educated, while Malay parents had yet to                
reach that consensus, although there were already many cases of Malay parents enrolling their              
daughters in various types of schools by then. 
The explanation that the pursuit of women’s education was only as a response to Chinese               
women’s education is in line with Soenarnoe’s argument that early Malay nationalism was less              
about united Malay political action, and was more of an “attempt of a feudal society to adapt to                  
the new world of democracy and socialism.” Malays had neither truly formulated ideas             51
regarding Malay nationalism (or later women's education), but they participated in these            
rebellions as a response to the anxieties of the time. In this case, the increase in Chinese                 
vernacular schools and the large-scale enrollment of girls in those schools required an equal or at                
least similar response from Malays.  
The motives of the ​Kaum Muda ​in pushing for education can also be complicated when               
we read stories they produced at a time when women’s education was a hot topic. One particular                 
50 ​Tan Liok Ee. 1997. ​The politics of Chinese education in Malaya​, 1945 –1961. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
51 Soenarno bin, Radin. ​Malay Nationalism, 1896-1941​. Cambridge University Press, 1960: 24 
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story that has been commented on by Musa (2010), Hooker (1994), and Roff (1967) is ​Hikayat                
Faridah Hanum (​The Adventures of Faridah Hanum​) by Syed Shaykh al-Hadi in 1925. The              
novel tells the story of two young, upper-class Egyptians, Faridah Hanum and her lover, Shafik.               
Throughout the novel, Faridah exudes the true qualities of what Musa dubs the ‘New Malay               
Woman,” the ideal Malay woman in the eyes of the Kaum Muda. This new woman must deal                 52
with the traditional pressure of maintaining the family’s domestic life, but also serve as informed               
and educated inspiration for their husbands to improve themselves. This argument, though            
apparently modern, in fact continued to privilege male superiority, with women only serving as              
buttresses to serve male ideals. Throughout the novel, Faridah urges her husband to improve              
himself. For example, “before marriage she demonstrates her loyalty and fidelity, and after             
marriage she herself exhibits and urges her husband to show a sense of responsibility or duty.”                53
The idea of wives serving as inspiration to their husbands was popular, but even more popular                
was the notion, even among some members of the ​Kaum Muda​, that women might take over                
men’s position in society should they get educated. These concerns could be seen in various               54
entries to periodicals submitted by men. While this concern seems more overtly patriarchal than              
that of the expectations of the ‘New Malay Woman’, both notions regard masculinity as central               
and assumed that everything else must be placed in relation to it.  
The two diverged, however, on what they believe feminine pressure on that masculinity             
could achieve. For al-Hadi, the pressure inspires Malay men (so long as the wives are pious and                 
virtuous), while for the concerned male readers of Malay periodicals, it would supplant men in               
52 Musa (2010) 
53Hooker, Virginia Matheson. “Transmission Through Practical Example: Women and Islam in 1920s Malay 
Fiction.” ​Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society​, vol. 67, no. 2 (267), 1994, pp. 93–118. 
JSTOR​, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/41493254. 
54 ​Saudara​, 21 December 1932 
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society. We can therefore say that the Kaum Muda wanted women’s education, but only to a                
certain point. “To them, the parameters for the new woman should focus on religion, handicrafts,               
and domestic skills. They argued that Muslim women should not be allowed to compete with               
men outside the home, to attend conferences, make speeches, or discuss economic matters.” In              55
critiquing the Kaum Muda for their motives, however, I would certainly stop short of calling               
them hypocritical. This is because Jayawerdana provided detailed evidence in many other Asian             
countries that male reformers pushed for women’s education only in order to entrench patriarchy.              
This, therefore, seems more like a discourse of new societies confronting their respective             
versions of patriarchy rather than as an exclusively Malay problem.  56
British Policy's Impact on (Women's) Education 
While these changes were ongoing, we should not assume that the colonial enterprise was              
watching inertly. These were stressful times for empires across the globe. The sound of              
nationalism was beginning to echo around the world, spurred on by ideas made popular by               
uprisings in the West. Arifin notes that between 1945 and 1957, the British were strategizing               
methods of ‘recolonization’ , or ways to ensure their best interests were respected, even after              57
they left their colonies. However, even before 1945, the British had influenced education             
heavily. These may or may not have been efforts at recolonization, but they definitely had a                
strong impact in moulding the paradigm in the Malayan peninsula. As early as the first decade of                 
the twentieth century, the existing British policy of favoring boys in education was seen to               
impact some states. In Kedah, for example, some Malays were already pushing for the education               
of their daughters, but because it had not yet become mainstream opinion, the British ignored               
55 Manderson quoted by Musa, 249 
56 Jayawardena, Kumari. ​Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World​. Zed Books, 1994. 
57 Ariffin, 2 
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petitions and requests to educate Malay women. Even with royal pressure, the British were slow               
to respond to these requests. Thus, notes Arifin, “the enthusiasm shown by the Kedah rulers and                
officials for providing vernacular education for girls in that state was not incorporated by the               
British into their educational plan for their own imperial (fiscal) interests.” If we look at the                58
policies implemented by the British, we note that the first schools they set up for Malays were                 
Etonian-style boys’ schools for the sons of the aristocracy, such as Malay College Kuala              
Kangsar. While the British did start opening girls schools later on, the reasons for the British                
pursuing this strategy warrant its own body of work. What we can see here is that colonial policy                  
on education contributed to slow progress on women's education. These policies would change             
significantly during the Japanese occupation of Malaya, which I will discuss in chapter 2.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have discussed the main issues that moulded Malay anxiety in the late                
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Kaum Muda is an example of possibly the first               
expression of that anxiety in their attempt to cure Malay backwardness through religious and              
educational reform. The fact that the reforms in education may have also been pushed because of                
the extent at which Chinese migrants were educating their children further underlines the             
motives of the Kaum Muda's reform project as one informed by Chinese in-migration. Their              
hesitancy appears also in their pushing for women's education only insofar that women do not               
overtake men in the economy. This issue was not helped by the British policy of prioritizing                
education for boys. 
58 Ibid, 252. Phrases in brackets are written by the original author. 
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In chapter 2 I will begin charting the different strategies of Malay women to further their                
cause. I opt to group these strategies into two categories, one I term radical and the other                 
pragmatic, defined by their strategy of either taking advantage of or confronting male             
superiority. The radicals were women with staunchly anti-colonial, "anti-feudal" views. Like           
other militant, anti-establishment political actors of the time, these women either refused or             
failed to work within the system of masculine authority due to their perceived ‘ímpatience’ at the                
slow progress of women's issues. I will focus on three women here, starting with Khatijah Sidek                
in chapter 2, and Shamsiah Fakeh and Tan Sri Aishah Ghani in chapter 3.  
Khatijah Sidek was a firebrand leader of the Kaum Ibu, the women’s auxiliary wing of                
the United Malays National Organization (UMNO). Ironically, UMNO was predominantly the           
party of elite Malays and those connected to either the British or the Malay nobility. Khatijah’s                
stint as leader of the Kaum Ibu would end when the party expelled her for her ‘lack of party                   
discipline’. Her case study shows us how radical tactics fared in UMNO. Shamsiah Fakeh, on the                
other hand, was radical in every sense of the term. She was the second leader of the group,                  
Angkatan Wanita Sedar (AWAS), or Awakened Women’s League, before the group was banned.             
She then joined other Malayan Communist Party members in the Malayan jungles to fight the               
British any way they could. 
On the pragmatic side, we see women working within the masculine system the radicals              
deplored. We should not understand pragmatic here as the opposite of radical, or as inherently               
conservative. Many of the views these women had can very well be considered ‘radical’ in their                
time, but the key distinction is that these women worked within the masculine system and rose                
up the ranks to achieve their goal. For these women, this was the most effective method. Here, I                  
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will analyze one case study mainly through her autobiography. Tan Sri Aishah Ghani was              
involved in Malay women’s politics from very early on, being appointed as the first leader of                
AWAS. She was, interestingly, the one who appointed Shamsiah Fakeh as her successor. This              
will be analyzed in chapter 3. Tan Sri Aishah Ghani would be appointed to several prominent                
positions, such as member of the Malaysian Senate, Malaysian representative to the United             
Nations, and Minister of Welfare. She would also receive the title ‘Tan Sri’, the second-most               
prestigious honorary title the Agong, or Head of Malay Sultans, can bestow upon Malaysian              
citizens. 
Chapter 2: Popular Protests, the Japanese, and  
Confronting Malay Male Dominance 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I will begin with a discussion of one of the most popular protests in its                  
time, the anti-Malayan Union protests. I will provide details about why the anti-Malayan Union              
protests in 1946 were so popular and this serves as a case study of how to capture Malay support                   
at the time. I then go backwards chronologically and introduce the KMM and the Malay               
Nationalist Party (PKMM), two political organizations which failed to gather the support the             
anti-MU protests did. Placing the KMM and PKMM next to the MU protests allow us to                
juxtapose a successful and not-so-successful organization to analyze where they differed. The            
chapter then discusses the Japanese occupation and how Malayan people fared. The economic             
catastrophe that was Japanese economic policy would have important impacts on Malayan            
concerns, as we shall see. The chapter then closes with a discussion about the Kaum Ibu (KI) of                  
UMNO and with a case study of Khatijah Sidek, who led the KI between 1954 to 1956.  
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 The Malayan Union Protests and the Question of Capturing Malay Support 
In 1946, Malays were united against the British proposal for a “Malayan Union”. Modern              
anti-colonialism had begun appearing in the Malay peninsula for at least twenty years already.              
Collective animosity against the colonizer was present in Malay society, but was mollified by the               
British strategy to rule Malays “through” the Sultans. What may seem bizarre then, is that no                59
political party or organization was able to capture the support of the majority of Malays for the                 
anti-colonialist cause before 1946, and even then, Malay resentment was not specifically            
funneled towards independence but only ​against ​the Malayan Union. The sudden increase in             
Malay political participation therefore dwindled once the Malayan Union was replaced with the             
Federation of Malaya in 1948. The failure to collectivize Malays into a coherent political              
movement will serve as the basis for much of this chapter. 
Seeking to streamline the administration of Malay states, the British proposed a new             
colonial administration to be called the Malayan Union (MU). The British aim to unify the               
region under one administration is understandable. The Malayan peninsula was far too            
disorganized for their liking. Take one Member of Parliament’s description of the many systems              
as "clumsy and wasteful and encouraged separatism and difficulties of administration”. As            60
Sopiee notes, “in an area about the size of England and with a population less than that of                  
London, there were not only nine legally sovereign States and ten sovereign monarchs (nine              
Malay and one british) but also ten legislatures, seven judicial systems, seven police forces, and               
59 Soenarno, Radin. ​Malay Nationalism, 1896-1941​. 
60 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 420, 1946/47, Mar. 4-22, p. 638. 
 
39 
seven civil services”. The MU would centralize all these administrations and systems under one              61
umbrella. The idea was to create a pathway to a self-governing Malay state in the long term, and                  
achieve efficiency in defense (against Communists) and in administration in the short term. In              
order to avoid Malays being incensed by this new administrative system, the British opted to               
exclude Singapore from the MU, as its population was predominantly Chinese, and the British              
finally thought it might be good not to disrupt the delicate demographics of the Malayan               
peninsula. Malay anger, to the immediate disarray of the British, was something they were              
unable to avoid.  
Three things in particular enraged Malays and explains the popularity of anti-MU            
protests. First, the British removed sovereignty from the state Sultans, only allowing them to              
“decide matters that pertained to Malay religion and custom”. This wording is almost exactly              62
what was agreed upon in the British Residency system that outraged Malays under the FMS               
system, and it would now apply to the entire region. Even individual state governments were               
only allowed tasks that the colonial administration assigned to them. Second, the MU, which              
became official in 1946, practiced ​jus soli​, or birthright citizenship. Malays viewed this as not               
only further encroachment by the British, but also as being forced to accept the minority races                
brought over by the British and Chinese for cheap labor into their state. Finally, it was not only                  
the new administration that angered Malays, but also the manner in which the British obtained               
approval for it. Sir Harold MacMichael, one of the most respected colonial administrators in              
Britain, was tasked with gathering support from Malay rulers for this incredibly important             
project within only one month! MacMichael used an incredibly firm strategy where he saw fit.               
61 Sopiee, Mohamed Noordin. ​From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation: Political Unification in the Malaysian 
Region 1945-1965​. University Malaya Press, 2007. 
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As Danz notes, “[MacMichael] was armed with the power to review the conduct of each ruler                
during the Japanese occupation. He was also empowered to depose of any ruler whose conduct               
was deemed unsatisfactory and name a successor​. ​Consulting each Ruler separately, MacMichael            
effectively precluded any united action”.  63
 
PMSJ-led protests against the Malayan Union.  64
 
The fledgling national Movement of Peninsular Malays Johor (PMSJ) led by a Malay             
leader named Dato’ Onn, known among Malays for his Chief Ministership of the state of Johor,                
protested around the country demanded a move away from MU. Their support was massive. At               
its inception, the PMSJ boasted a membership of “15,000 Malay members, including 450             
women. Ten months later its membership had grown to 24,218”. The swiftness with which the               65
British responded to these protests is likely explained by the large number of supporters the               
63 Dancz, 85 
64 Photo courtesy of Wikipedia Commons 
65 ​Dancz, 85 
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anti-MU camp had garnered. This level of participation had never been seen in Malaya. It also                
included what Dancz called “old Malay hands,” who were Malays in the British press pressuring               
the colonial government from the inside. In the background, it is also likely that the very idea                 66
that Malay anger with British policy could lead to more support or sympathy for radical groups                
such as the Communists made the British extremely nervous.  
Captain L.D. Gammans and Sir Theodore Adams, two members of British parliament,            
were the representatives tasked with reporting to parliament about the protests that had been              
erupting around Malaya. When Gammans stepped foot in the peninsula, one thing in particular              
caught his eye. Below is a quote from Gammans about his observation: 
“In the towns there were demonstrations with 5000 to 10000 people standing in front of               
us. ​But the most remarkable thing of all ​was the part women were playing in this great national                  
movement. In the 14 years I lived in Malaya I scarcely ever spoke to a Malay woman. But today                   
they go up on political platforms and make speeches; unmarried girls make speeches through              
microphones that would not have disgraced anybody in this committee”   67
- Capt L.D. Gammans in a report on Malay response to the Malayan Union, 1946. (Emphasis his) 
Gammans, who was a Colonial Serviceman in Malaya from 1920 to 1934, came back              
only 12 years later to witness Malay women being allowed to do things he never thought                
possible. He summarizes his opinion in the short statement, "The Malays have undoubtedly             
become politically conscious overnight." While he exaggerates his observation, the change           68
Gammans described can largely be attributed to Malay women’s education, which I described in              
chapter 1 and how it was accelerated by Chinese enthusiasm in educating their own daughters.               
66 Ibid,. 
67 Dancz, 85 
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That education, along with two other factors: rural-urban migration and employment in new             
professional sectors are what shifted women’s attitudes and society’s expectations of women, as             
Aljunied argues. Prior to the MU protests, no group or party had achieved this level of Malay                 
support. To properly contextualize this, we need to take a look at the parties that existed before                 
PMSJ.  
 
Radical Malay Politics 1938-1948 
Prior to the 1930s, Roff argues that Malays were experiencing a period of increased              
“self-consciousness and self-assertiveness prompted by… economic pressures, and most of all by            
existing or threatened alien encroachment on Malay rights”. Radical politicians, however,           69
would still largely fail to garner support of Malays, despite this trend. Malays in general were                
very reluctant to join movements that criticized religion, an important factor as to why the               
Malayan Communist Party was, from its inception to its downfall, considered to be             
‘Chinese-dominated’. Malays were also still very loyal to their Sultans, and any indication that              70
an organization had republican intent would be met with fierce opposition, or at the very least a                 
damning lack of support. But even for the Kesatuan Melayu Muda (KMM), or the Union of                
Young Malays, who were not overtly Communist, support dwindled. This is because Malays             
largely regarded the KMM as “an offshoot of the Kaum Muda… which was regarded as               
wayward and impetuous”. While the later Movement of Peninsular Malays led by Dato’ Onn              71
would enjoy membership in the tens of thousands at its formation, in its seven-year life-span the                
KMM membership never broke past a measly two hundred. Some of this can be attributed the                
69 Roff, 211 
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fact that KMM was founded earlier than PMSJ, and therefore would not be able to capitalize on                 
Malays being increasingly literate and self-conscious, nor on Malay anger at MU proposals. The              
bigger reason for the difference in support, however, lies in the fundamental ideology that              
Malays wanted to support, and the KMM was far too radical for most Malays.  
Radicals were very aware that they lacked popular Malay support. Attempts can be seen              
from their part to accommodate more conservative Malay positions. Firstly, all radical parties             
shared a degree of contempt for the Sultans, who they believed either symbolized or directly               
represented the ‘feudal’ Malay past. This was true of the Leftist parties like the CPM and                72
KMM, but also for the radical Islamist Hizbul Muslimin (HM). Realizing that anti-monarchist             
tendencies were extremely unpopular among Malays, these groups softened their tone on the             
Sultans. This was to the extent that the KMM, while working with the Japanese in their goal for                  
independence “found it necessary to invite [Malay Sultans] to participate in the new             
administration that [the KMM leader] wanted to form after independence, which he believed             
would be given by the Japanese. Even the CPM, which was ideologically against feudalism later               
had to change its position and accept the Sultan as the symbol of the Malay traditional identity”.                
Another radical Malay party, the Malay Nationalist Party (MNP, PKMM in Malay), formed in               73
1945, would also try to solve the pertinent issue of popular Malay support. Dr. Burhanuddin               
al-Helmy, one of its co-founders, would try to overcome this issue by using strategic              
membership into his party. Dr Burhanuddin realized that the only way nationalism would gain a               
strong foothold among Malays would be to fuse anti-colonialist elements with Islam. This fusion              
would then be turned into a politically coherent popular nationalist movement. He saw the MNP               
72 ​‘Feudal’ was a term specifically used by many radical Malay politicians in this context. See Ali (2015). 
73 Ali, 37 
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as the main vehicle to achieve this goal. While also trying to avoid a complete takeover of                 
Communist members in MNP leadership, Burhanuddin also believed that this strategy “would            
create a middle ground within the PKMM one that would harmonize Islam, socialism,             
communism, and nationalism”. Lastly, in terms of allowing women more space in leadership             74
roles, the CPM were miles ahead of their Malay counterparts. Prior to the interwar years, the                
KMM felt that the time was not right for women to be actively engaged in politics. Their opinion                  
was based on the “conservative gender rhetoric and attitudes found in the Malay community”.              75
This does indicate that the KMM realized some boundaries that they felt they could not focus on                 
too much in fear of losing even more support for themselves among the Malays. This attitude                
would shift, however, especially near the end of Japanese occupation, as Malay women’s             
associations became more prevalent. The MNP, possibly noting a shift in stance among Malays              
vis-a-vis women in politics, actually formed their own women’s wing, the Angkatan Wanita             
Sedar (League of Enlightened Women, AWAS). Its express goal was to increase MNP             
membership by encouraging women to join their movement. This organization will be a central              
focus of chapter 3.  
An area of contention between the CPM and the KMM would be the idea of ‘Melayu                
Raya’, a popular proposition among Malay radicals. ‘Melayu Raya’ basically proposed a union             
between the Malay peninsula and modern-day Indonesia. The CPM regarded it as too narrow a               
focus, wanting instead to focus on their goal of international Communism. The KMM and some               
members of the MNP considered it the only way a country can incorporate most of the Malay                 
identities in the region. Optimism in achieving this goal went through peaks and troughs, but for                
74 Aljunied, 134 
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the most part, many peninsula Malays considered it unfavorable. It would be deemed completely              
impractical once the Indonesians, led by a nationalist revolutionary Sukarno, would declare their             
own independence from the Dutch in 1949.  
During the Japanese occupation, alliances also realigned heavily. The radical Malays           
were (initially) optimistic with their east Asian counterparts, while the Communists worked with             
the British to remove the Japanese. The latter can be attributed to the immense cruelty of the                 
Japanese toward the Chinese, who made up the majority of CPM membership.  
 
Japanese Rule of Malaya: A Dark Time For All (1941-1945) 
The Japanese invasion of Malaya was swift and caught the British completely off guard.              
On the midnight of December 8th 1941, marching through an acquiescent Thailand, the Japanese              
began their attack on the Malay peninsula. They received help from Malay radicals, excited by               
the prospect of an Asian nation aiding in kicking out Western imperialists. Radicals in this period                
were organized under the KMM. They provided vital intelligence that allowed the Japanese to              
navigate through the thick Malayan jungles. Combining their intel with a strategic combination             76
of stealth (with bicycles) and air bombings, the Japanese conquered Malay land, from the              
Malay-Thai border all the way down to Singapore, within only three months, even with the               
British fighting tooth and nail against them. The Japanese would grant Malay radicals freedom              77
by releasing many of them from prison.  
At the beginning of Japanese rule, Malays were optimistic, and it was not just the               
radicals. “Many rural Malays welcomed the invasion with hopes that they would soon enjoy              
76 Aljunied, 74 
77 The British even struck a deal with the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) to ensure the MCP would fight the 
Japanese from within, should Malaya be overrun by the Japanese​. 
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economic prosperity and equal treatment previously unimaginable under British rule”. The           78
members of the KMM, of course, were the most optimistic. Under Japanese patronage, the KMM               
flourished. They started their own newspapers, their membership numbers jumped, and they            
received direct military protection from their new patrons. To add to that, Japanese publishing              79
firms had been conducting covert psychological propaganda since the late 1930s, publishing five             
different newspapers in three languages in Singapore. This powerful Japanese propaganda           80
machine had distributed flyers and posters declaring "Asia for the Asiatics!' and detailing plans              
for a "Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere", prospects which were in stark contrast with              
subordination under British colonization. But the entire mood would turn sour very soon.  
Over time, the true colors of the Japanese rulers became evident. With the First and               
Second Sino-Japanese Wars still fresh in collective memory, the Japanese took Chinese villagers             
captive and tortured those suspected of Communist tendencies. Using the brute force of the much               
feared Kempeitai (Japanese secret police), the Japanese utilized torture to hunt down ‘British             
sympathizers’. This was such the case that war crimes committed by the Japanese was not               
unheard of. Malay radicals started to feel cheated when KMM members inquiring about long              
term possibility for Malayan independence were “rebuffed” by the Japanese. Even Malays who             81
previously worked under the British colonial administration were routinely captured and           
tortured. Malay radicals were starting realize that the Japanese did not free a fellow Asian state,                
but only kicked out one colonizer to serve their own colonial ambitions. Aljunied notes that this                
78 ​Ibid,. 
79 Hussain, Mustapha. ​Malay Nationalism before UMNO: The Memoirs of Mustapha Hussain​. Utusan, 2005​. 
80 ​Kratoska, Paul H. ​The Japanese Occupation of Malaya: a Social and Economic History​. Hurst & Co, 1998. p. 27 
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all led to the eventual conclusion from the prominent KMM member Mustapha Hussain that “the               
Japanese victory was not our victory”.  82
Economic planning during the Japanese occupation was also disastrous. First, they           
created an economic system built heavily on bureaucracy and central planning but rarely             
followed their own plans. Various Malay and Chinese employees of various Japanese agencies             
complained of preferential treatment to Japanese people, and sometimes blatant law-breaking.  
Second, the Japanese loss at the Battle of Midway had significant impact on the Malayan               
economy because of the loss of the ability to export and import goods between countries. After                
losing 248 fighter jets and the ​Kido Butai​, a naval carrier which had been instrumental to                
Japanese naval victories including the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese began to lose control               
of the waters in Southeast Asia. Allied bombardment made shipping within the region on a               83
large scale practically impossible. This became a huge problem as shipping was vital to achieve               
Japanese aspirations for a 'Co-Prosperity Sphere' (CPS). Rivers were not a reliable mode of              
transportation either, as even in the monsoon season, Japanese officers found that rivers did not               
run deep enough or long enough for the international logistical purposes the Japanese wanted.              84
Inland roads were even worse. They often went through deep jungles and required experienced              
trekking knowledge to hike through, and more importantly, they were obviously not built for              
heavy transportation of goods and labor. In 1942, the Japanese announced plans to build the               
Burma-Siam Railway, an extremely ambitious project to connect land deep in Burma to Siam              
over three hundred miles.  
82 Ibid,. 
83 Symonds, Craig L. ​The Battle of Midway​. Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 270 
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This Japanese solution to the lack of a feasible international mode of transportation was,              
however, going to take years to build. In the meantime, local industries suffered from not being                
able to export and import. Three areas were especially problematic: commercial agriculture (tin             
and rubber), food, and medicine. Local tin mines and rubber plantations, which relied extremely              
heavily on the ability to export (especially to the Allies), were choked from their main source of                 
revenue. Unemployment soared. Previously, 60% of the rice in Malaya was imported. With the              
Japanese deciding to restrict trade among countries in their empire, Malayans suffered. This was              
exacerbated when the Japanese, in an act of political reciprocation, decided to cede the Northern               
Malay states to Thailand for their help in the initial Malayan invasion. As 59% of Malayan rice                 
was cultivated in these states, starvation rose. Kratoska argues that US intelligence estimated             85
that the remaining Malay states could only satisfy 14% of Malayan demand for rice. Medicines               
were also very hard to come by during the occupation, resulting in deaths due to malaria jumping                 
tenfold as a result of key ingredients becoming scarcer.  
Third, various Japanese policies went against all economic convention, especially          
important were their policy of printing fiat money excessively and also by setting idealistic price               
ceilings for basic necessities. Both of these issues created a situation ripe for the development of                
a massive black market. On the former point, the result was hyperinflation at levels never seen in                 
the region. Setting the base inflation at 100 in 1942, Huff and Majima found the "ratio of prices                  86
at the end of occupation to prices at its beginning" at a whopping 11,226.5! On the ground, this                  
translated worse off for those who lived on a basic wage. On the latter point, there were clear                  
85 Kratoska, Paul H. “The Post-1945 Food Shortage in British Malaya.” ​Journal of Southeast Asian Studies​, vol. 19, 
no. 01, 1988, p. 28 
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instances when even local advice for economic policy was ignored by Japanese administrators.             
Take the case of Raja Othman, who argued that setting a price ceiling at rates that were too low                   
would incentivize people to sell on the black market. This advice was not heeded, likely               87
because of the popularity of setting price ceilings at much lower than was required. The               
combination of hyperinflation, ridiculously low price ceilings, and the fact that Japanese officers             
themselves were 'kingpins' in the black market they banned, led to the thriving of the black                
market. Every level of society had to engage in the black market at some point, with the risk of                   
beating, detainment, and torture if the colonial officials found out. This led to a situation where                
goods brought in from Japan to curb black market activities were themselves immediately traded              
on the black market. 
Fourth, and lastly, another characteristic that exacerbated the economic problems in           
Malaya was the setting up of 'Kumiais'. The colonial government, apparently noticing "wasteful             
competition", attempted to reduce wastage by grouping firms in the same business into an              
association known as a ​Kumiai. The Japanese intended for them to streamline the production              88
process in order to control prices and increase economic efficiency. Not only were the goals not                
met, but in effect, the Kumiai system created monopolies in almost all industries, allowing the               
Kumiais to make exorbitant profits. For example, in the case of pomfret fish, fishermen sold their                
fish for $200 per pikul (133.33 lbs) to the Kumiais. Once the Kumiais had transported and                
processed the goods, the price was given at $600 per pikul for consumers, three times the price                 
from the fishermen, profit margins greater than in any period of British colonization. 
87 Kratoska (1998), p. 166 
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Nearing the end of the occupation, due to intense labor shortage, Japanese newspapers             
also produced propaganda chiding women who were not in the workforce. This was a complete               
shift from their normal view. As late as 1943, Japanese papers were still criticizing the Allies for                 
hiring women for technical jobs, stating that "inter-mixed divisions in the front line will surely               
appear to be demoralized". Kratoska argues that the shift in propaganda eased the labor              89
shortage only minimally. What was clear is that throughout the occupation, the Japanese             
understood little of the local population and of economic policies.  
Japanese colonization eventually ended in 1946 with the Japanese surrender and the            
beginning of the interregnum of the 14-day rule by the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army              
(MPAJA) and later the British Military Administration (BMA). A period that began with such              
optimism now ended with starvation, poverty, and unbelievable loss of wealth and life for              
everyone but the Japanese themselves. The entire period had several lessons for Malays. They              
were now more mobile, more politically aware, and their women were now increasingly             
educated, working, and politically active. The next section discusses the most important women's             
organization of its time, the Kaum Ibu. 
 
Women’s Political Issues and the Establishment of Kaum Ibu 1945-1949 
While Malay women’s associations had existed as early as 1929, many of these             
associations stopped operating during the interwar period. These associations started out           
focusing more on the traditional roles of women. Women often met in groups informally to hold                
cooking and sewing classes, and often engaged in other social activities aimed at strengthening              
89 Kratoska (2005), p. 245 
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friendship bonds. Many formal women’s associations did start operating during the early 1940s,             
and accelerated during the Malayan Union period (1946-1948). During the two decades leading             
up to Malaysian independence in 1957, women’s organizations started to shift their focus toward              
women’s illiteracy. For some, this shift happened without a ‘shift’ per se, given that both before                
and after the interwar period, some women’s organizations aimed to increase “knowledge of its              
members”, which they defined as women’s domestic skills prior to the Japanese occupation and              
as illiteracy later on. It is also worth noting here that it was not only the Malay women who                   90
were advocating for women’s education, but women’s associations of all races in Malaya.  
For other Malay women’s associations, there was a clear shift in strategy before and after               
Japanese occupation. The connections and bonds made during the years of informal associations             
would turn out beneficial for these organizations, as women began utilizing those connections for              
other political purposes. One such example is the Persatuan Kaum Ibu Selangor (PKIS), which              
initially started out as an informal group of women who gathered to “knit for the British”, but                 
stopped operating during the Japanese occupation. They came together again and renamed            
themselves once they heard about the MU. Their operations after that were specifically to              
express grievances against the MU. Clearly, women were beginning to become politically            91
savvy and were gaining experience being a part of political organizations. The establishment of              
an umbrella body of women’s associations called the Kaum Ibu (KI, trans. Women’s League).              
Before going into detail about the establishment of the Kaum Ibu (KI) in , we would need to                  
delve further into the forming of its parent organization, the UMNO.  
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Even before UMNO’s formation, there were efforts to consolidate the many sporadic            
Malay organizations at the time into one body. Onn himself was successful in doing so in his                 
home state of Johor. The aforementioned PMSJ had in its constitution that its goal was ​“​to unite                 
the Malays​, and to strive for and defend the special position and privileges of the Malays”.                92
Riding on his wave of popular support and fame, Onn would write a letter to the Malay paper                  
Warta Negara​, outlining his “appreciation and support of the idea advocated in the Warta Negara               
a few weeks earlier, that a congress of Malays be held as early as possible not only for resolving                   
the differences that existed between the Malay associations themselves but also to discuss the              
fate of the Malays in the Peninsula”. The impact of his letter was immediate, and in 1946, a                  93
group called the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) as a result of various levels of               
meetings and discussions from representatives of forty-two different Malay associations. Its           
immediate focus would be opposing the MU. 
UMNO enjoyed popular Malay support that no other organization had ever achieved.            
Their rallies opposing the MU regularly had tens of thousands in attendance all over the               
peninsula. While UMNO’s main support base lay with rural Malays living in villages, its              
leadership was made up almost entirely of elite Malays. These were those who the British had                
been actively training to be a part of the colonial administration and Malays related to royalty.                
Onn himself was from a family deeply embedded in Johor politics. His father, Jaafar              
Muhammad, was the first and longest-serving Chief Minister of Johor (1886-1919) and started             
out his career working closely with the legendary Tun Daeng Ibrahim, former ​Temenggong ​of              
92 Constitution of the Peninsular Malay Movement of Johore, Art. I,  
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Johor and famous for revolutionizing the Johor economy with the ​Kangcu ​system. It was              94
political leaders like Onn, who had deep connections with the British and Malay royalty and               
elite, that would become UMNO’s leaders. According to Fulston, “[s]ome 80 percent of senior              
UMNO members were English educated, and approximately 50 percent had pursued further            
education in the United Kingdom. About half of its leaders were public servants, with almost 30                
percent in senior positions in the civil service”.  95
During the very first meeting to form UMNO, discussions about a women’s wing were              
already underway, though it would take longer to set up than it took to set up UMNO. Puteh                  
Mariah, who would go on to be the KI’s first ​Ketua ​(Leader), proposed the idea to UMNO’s                 
upper hierarchy and was encouraged by Dato’ Onn’s unwavering support. Dancz, in an interview              
with Puteh Mariah herself, was informed that Onn once told her that “Little can be achieved                
without [women’s] cooperation”. At a time when the issue of women being politicians was still a                
newly developing discussion, Onn’s support proved extremely important and “lent legitimacy…           
and tended to blunt any opposition”. The idea of the KI being a separate entity but affiliated to                  96
UMNO was pushed by Puteh Mariah herself, as she felt that structure would encourage Malay               
women to join.  
For a while, KI’s members enjoyed the freedom of being separate from UMNO but the               
network and prestige of being affiliated to them. They soon realized that because female              
representation in UMNO came from them, and because of their role as an independent umbrella               
94 ​This is not to be confused with ​Adat Temenggong, ​which has nothing to do with the position of Temenggong, 
which is similar to that of a Prime Minister.  
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organization of women’s associations merely affiliated with UMNO, there was a lack of female              
representation in the party’s upper hierarchy. This sentiment culminated when on the 25th of              
August 1949, “more than 200 women at the Twelfth General Assembly of UMNO at              
Butterworth agreed to officially reconstitute the Pergerakan Kaum Ibu as a single auxiliary of the               
party rather than continuing as independent state affiliate women’s organizations”. This was            97
also part of a wider step by UMNO to make the party more cohesive. For KI, this meant that they                    
would now be subject to UMNO rules, and importantly as we shall see, UMNO rules on party                 
discipline.  
Politically, the emphasis on illiteracy would carry on long after the Kaum Ibu’s             
establishment. Ibu Zain, who took over from Puteh Mariah in 1950 “estimated that of the women                
who joined the KI only 50 per cent were literate… the high illiteracy rate explains the heavy                 
emphasis the KI placed on forming literacy classes and its interest in education for Malay girls                
and women”.  98
 
Autobiographies as Gateways to Malayan Women 
One of the main goals of this paper is to elucidate specific strategies developed by               
individual Malay women. To achieve this, I have selected three women as case studies for their                
strategy. The three women are Khatijah Sidek, Tan Sri Aishah Ghani and Shamsiah Fakeh. The               
case studies of the latter two will be discussed in chapter 3. Before beginning with Khatijah                
Sidek, however, I would like to make a few statements regarding the sources used for these case                 
studies and also the overarching similarities between the three women. 
97 ​Manderson, 60 
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Primarily, autobiographies are the main source of information for these case studies. In             
fact, many of the political leaders at the time wrote autobiographies of their own at some point,                 
and it is through these documents that we can see how women's issues were translated into                
political action. There may be concerns from some regarding the authenticity of stories in              
autobiographies written much later than the events themselves. While this is a reasonable             
concern, the kinds of tampering that an autobiography is subject to is not all too different from                 
most other historical documents. For our purposes, what we do have is more than one               
autobiography to read and juxtapose. I will analyze differences in the way certain events are told,                
particularly in the case of Tan Sri Aishah Ghani's suggestion to appoint Shamsiah Fakeh in               
chapter 3. This should, therefore, be the focus of the autobiographies. It is not just that the events                  
happened, but that to these women, certain aspects of those events were most notable, while for                
others it may have been completely forgettable. David Carlson, writing in Dobson and Ziemann's              
book on reading primary sources, tells us that "[Roy] Pascal's motivating insight [in his book               
Design and Truth in Autobiography​] was that autobiography offers its readers insight into the              
'consciousness' of an author (the way that his or her memory reshapes past experience)" rather               
than simply into the objective truth of that author's life." If we were to take this to its logical                   99
conclusion, ​even if ​some facts have been dressed up or altered slightly, the key themes               
emphasized in these autobiographies can tell us what these women felt was important about their               
lives. It does not need saying that key similarities in all three books then would deserve a lot of                   
analysis. In this, I have identified two main similarities, Indonesian schooling and issues with              
marriage.  
99 Dobson, Miriam, and Benjamin Ziemann. ​Reading Primary Sources: the Interpretation of Texts from Nineteenth- 
and Twentieth-Century History​. Routledge, 2009. p. 177 
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First, all three of these women went to school in some part of Indonesia. While this fact is                  
certainly important to these women, it was not a requirement for being selected as a case study in                  
this paper. In this context, the location of their schooling is mere coincidence. This topic's               
importance to all three women is obvious in the number of pages allocated in their three                
autobiographies talking about school. All three women allocate at least a full chapter talking              
about education or school. While it might be a coincidence, their schooling in Indonesia              
definitely shaped the way these women thought a lot. While schools in Malaya, especially the               
kinds of schools Malays went to, emphasized training students to become low-to-middle level             
administrators, schools in Indonesia had a nationalist tinge. This was addressed directly by             
Shamsiah Fakeh, who says that her schooling in ​Diniyah Putri ​"sparked" her nationalism. It              100
was certainly tempting to include heavy comparative analysis between schools in Indonesia and             
Malaya, but the amount of analysis that would require exceeded beyond the scope of this paper's                
goal of analyzing just these women's political strategies. 
Second, all three of these women were either proposed to at a young age or were obliged                 
to marry at a young age. None of these women sought teenage marriage, and only Shamsiah                101
Fakeh was unable to stop her parents' wishes to marry her off once they found a suitor.                 
Unfortunately, Shamsiah would then go into two marriages both of which ended badly for her.               
Tan Sri Aishah Ghani went on hunger strike in order to not get married, while Khatijah simply                 
lied to her parents to get out of being married off by her parents. Clearly, ​not ​getting married at                   102
a young age was advantageous in many ways. All three of these women intended to attain a                 
100 Shamsiah Fakeh, 18 
101 Women marrying in their early teens was very common at the time and was not considered 'too young', though 
puberty was always a necessary condition for marriage. 
102 Sidek, 40  
 
57 
higher education. In fact, Shamsiah's second marriage was only agreed to because her soon-to-be              
husband agreed to allow her to go to school if she wanted. Marriage often stopped women from                 
going to higher education institutions, and all three women made it clear that they wanted to                
improve their education level. Not getting married also absolved them from the heavy burden of               
taking care of a household, which would no doubt have helped their schooling. Shamsiah Fakeh's               
schooling was interrupted when her husband wanted her to travel miles to meet him so that he                 
could divorce her amicably.  
These similarities greatly inform us about the era these women were living in. It also               
details specific issues that would become concerns of any women's political organization. The             
first case study I will present is that of Khatijah Sidek. I chose her to start because while I believe                    
her tactics to be radical, in that she directly confronted male patriarchy instead of attempting to                
utilize it to advance women's issues, her leadership of the supposedly conservative elite UMNO              
allows us to see both what was acceptable to UMNO and what was deemed 'radical'. In short, her                  
membership in UMNO is similar to that of Tan Sri Aishah Ghani, while her radical tactics is                 
similar to Shamsiah Fakeh. Beginning with Khatijah Sidek also means that I will present the case                
studies in reverse chronological order. This should not be too much of a concern as it is the                  
strategies or tactics they employed that I seek to scrutinize. I also opted to discuss Aishah and                 
Shamsiah in one chapter as they both had roots in AWAS, while Khatijah never did. 
 
Khatijah Sidek: Early Life 
In UMNO's 1954 General Assembly, an Indonesian woman (allowed UMNO          
membership because she was married to a Malayan Malay) decided to contest the seat of Kaum                
 
58 
Ibu leader. The incumbent, known as Ibu Zain, was very popular among Malay women. To               
Khatijah, however, Ibu Zain was not aggressive enough in pushing women's issues. Women's             
allocation of General Assembly seats was still relatively low (am still looking for the quoteble               
sources). A fiery orator who had opened "130 [Kaum Ibu] branches and had increased UMNO               
membership by 10,000" , Khatijah was even more popular among women for her fearlessness             103
and sharp mind. Just two years later, Khatijah would be expelled from UMNO. Official UMNO               
sources tell us that the reason for her expulsion was breaking party discipline. While this may be                 
at least partly true, it is difficult to argue that any other member of the UMNO Supreme Council                  
(which the title of Kaum Ibu leader entitled Khatijah to join) would have been immediately               
expelled as she was. I argue that her expulsion is an example of how women's radical tactics                 
fared in a male-dominated UMNO. The very existence of the Kaum Ibu at the time indicates that                 
UMNO men were not unconcerned with women's issues. In fact, Dato' Onn's support was              
instrumental in giving women suffrage after Puteh Mariah suggested it to Onn in a private               
meeting. However, UMNO men did not take kindly to Khatijah's aggressive tactics which they              
felt went overboard. The perfect summary of the internalizing of UMNO's male dominance can              
be seen in Tan Sri Aishah Ghani herself, when she wrote that "Khadijah was ambitious and                
really wanted to be in the same position as other UMNO leaders. ​But she lacked patience​". In                 104
this context, Aishah is saying that Khatijah needed to be more pragmatic, and should have               
selected her battles. Ironically, she is saying that challenging male dominance needed to take a               
backseat to advancing women's issues. 
103 Sidek, 145 
104 Ghani, 89. Emphasis my own. 
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Before taking a good look at Khatijah's expulsion, I will discuss her origins and how she                
came to be the KI's leader. Born in 1918 to her parents in Pariaman, Sumatra, she emphasizes                 
mysticism as a big part of her childhood. Her mother was a very superstitious person. She                
received advice that, because she desperately wanted a daughter, she should secretly trade rice              
with a group of unmarried women. Apparently, eating this rice during pregnancy would make the               
baby female. Throughout her autobiography, she is critical of her conservative and            105
superstitious mother, while always praising her father. It was her father that wanted Khatijah to               
become a doctor, while her mother wanted to marry her off to a local villager so that she would                   
always be near her. The different visions that her parents had for her was an important part of her                   
childhood. This would matter when her parents wanted her to go to different secondary schools,               
with her father preferring a Dutch-run school while her mother preferred a religious one. Her               
father would eventually win by basically kidnapping her and enrolling her in the Dutch school               
without the mother's knowledge. 
After she finished her schooling there, she provides an anecdote that showcases her             
unique bravery. A certain Mr Jensen had told her she was ineligible to enrol in a certain school                  
because she did not have sufficiently good grades. She questioned this reasoning, noting how her               
classmates had come to know her as a bright individual. A 13-year-old Khatijah, driven to Mr.                
Jensen's house by her big brother, marched alone into her school principal's house and demanded               
he let her enrol in the school she wanted. She found it strange that as soon as she demanded it,                    
Mr. Jensen promised to put effort into getting Khatijah enrolled into the school she wanted. What                
is more interesting than the anecdote is how Khatijah thinks about it. She says that "in my old                  
105 Sidek, 34 
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school, some of our teachers were Dutch, we always talked to them and were not afraid of them."                 
Her experience in the Dutch school had made her unafraid of white male dominance and                106
brave enough to directly confront it. Her brother, on the other hand, was scared "while waiting in                 
the car".  107
Even during her schooling years, Khatijah was politically active. She was actually            
expelled from her Dutch school for advocating Indonesian independence. She then started a             
self-improvement group with four other girls in the school she enrolled in after that called               
'Ardjasni'. This group would attempt to improve themselves so that they would be compared to               
the "smarter" Batak girls in that school, who received preferential treatment from the school              
teachers due to their Christian faith. Clearly, Khatijah was a very politically active young girl               
throughout grade school. 
This trait would carry on throughout her life. In 1943, she travelled to Singapore to "see                
the condition of women there". In 1946, Ibu Zain, then leader of Kaum Ibu, would offer her                 108
membership into UMNO's Kaum Ibu. She was initially reluctant, knowing that UMNO was             
conservative in their approach and had never officially uttered the word 'Merdeka' in any speech               
or song. Dato' Onn, who was then the President of UMNO, did not want her to join the party, and                    
that would stop her from joining. But when the party leadership changed to Tunku Abdul               
Rahman, she would accept, acknowledging the potential UMNO had to achieve independence.  
 
 
 
106 Khatijah Sidek, 41 
107 Ibid,. 
108 Sidek, 77 
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The Kaum Ibu's "Warrior" Leader: 1954-1956 
Khatijah was a fantastic political mobilizer. Not only did she have the oratory skill to               
inspire crowds of men and women, she had the political acumen to grow UMNO's Kaum Ibu                
from a small group to a national organization. The Kaum Ibu was already doing well under                
previous leadership, but after Khatijah took over, UMNO was practically dependent on them. KI              
held fundraising activities, and opened branches across the nation. The importance of KI to              
UMNO was not unknown, especially not to Khatijah herself. In an UMNO meeting of eighty               
delegates, only four seats were allocated to the Kaum Ibu. These four voices were not there to                 
remain quiet, however. The following is an excerpt from her autobiography, detailing what she              
demanded from the assembly: 
"Why was not a single women chosen to be on the UMNO Supreme Council? Does this                
mean that you men value us only as supplements to male power?... Look, we women sold these                 
handkerchiefs that we made ourselves and raised $500 that we then gave to the party. You men                 
did nothing of the sort... If this is the way you men are going to act, there is no use for us to                       
attend this assembly."  109
The Tunku, likely realizing the importance of the KI, then promptly told her that he, as                
President, was going to select one woman from the KI to be on the Supreme Council. This                 
woman was none other than Khatijah herself. This would prove immediately beneficial to             
UMNO, as her first suggestion was to establish the position of 'Chief Liaison of KI' who would                 
"go from village to village, explaining the wing's motives and goals". This suggestion would              110
be a lasting legacy for Khatijah and the position remains to this day a core part of KI's political                   
109 Sidek, 132 
110 Ibid, 133 
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strategy. Syed Jaafar Albar, then the Chief Liaison for UMNO, questioned the necessity of              
having a specific position for the KI, but Khatijah argued that there was a need, as women would                  
respond much better to other women and this would boost membership. The Tunku's trust in               
Khatijah would benefit him greatly. In the next general election, it became "common knowledge              
that UMNO won the election because of the female vote. Malay women came out in droves to                 
vote for UMNO". In the 1954 UMNO Assembly, the KI delegates would select Khatijah Sidek               111
as their ​'Ketua'​, in place of other candidates, including the incumbent, Ibu Zain, herself. 
As ​Ketua of the KI, Khatijah expanded policies on which what she had already been               
working. She continued it by introducing her own personal style of leadership training that              
involved trainees for several different positions to eat, sleep, and work with her at all times. She                 
opened new branches of KI almost every week and was kept very busy with her duties as a new                   
member of the Supreme Council. It was clear to her also that, within UMNO, there were several                 
men not happy that she was the new KI ​Ketua​. This was evident the moment she won the                  
election, with UMNO's General Secretary Yassin bin Abdul Rahman, openly questioned her            
intention to become ​Ketua​, by asking, "Now you want to be the ​Ketua​? Aren't you happy being                 
Kaum Ibu's General Secretary and Acting ​Ketua​?" She would reply simply, "There is no problem               
here. The branch has chosen me as ​Ketua ​and I accept the nomination. Why are you opposing                 
it?" Even after this incident, her detractors would try to bring her down by purposely omitting                112
her name from the party ballot. This enraged Khatijah, and she stormed out of the assembly.                
After being persuaded by the Perlis Chief Minister, who considered Khatijah as his own              
daughter, she reentered, made the officials correct the mistake, and won the election.   113
111 Ibid,. 
112 Ibid, 145 
113 Ibid, 147 
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In that same assembly, Khatijah went up on stage and delivered a fiery speech, focusing               
on the benefits her idea for a Chief Liaison of the Kaum Ibu she presented to the Tunku had had                    
and laid out her demands to UMNO. The speech was not well received and many opposed her                 
suggestions to give KI a higher allocation of seats in the assembly and to let women run in                  
general elections. Arguments from the men were that "women were weak, their work is in the                
kitchen, and the time has not come yet for women to sit in Parliament as they would require                  
courses on oratory skills."She ripped apart these ludicrous statements and told the assembly that              
women had done more for this party than any of the men present. The number of men who                  114
wanted to oust Khatijah from the party only grew the longer she stayed on as ​Ketua.  
Khatijah would only find out that she had been expelled from UMNO from a newspaper               
in Indonesia, where she was attending a conference. Ostensibly, she was expelled because she              
had divulged Supreme Council meeting information without authorization. The information they           
referred to was her speech at the general assembly where she 'divulged' that 130 KI branches had                 
been opened, membership had increased by 10,000, and that the idea for a Kaum Ibu Chief                
Liaison was her idea. To her, this was ridiculous, and the Kaum Ibu agreed with her. Branches                 
all over the country expressed their discontent at her expulsion. She notes how one letter to the                 
Tunku told him that "even when I heard her fight for women's rights in Pulau Pinang, I saw the                   
dirty looks from the men in the hall". The Tunku would receive many letters from other KI                 115
branches stating that if Khatijah was not allowed back into the party, they would resign. On the                 
other hand, Johor's UMNO branch stated their intent to quit the party should Khatijah's expulsion               
be revoked. Eventually, the Tunku set up a small task force to decide whether Khatijah was in                 
114 Ibid, 149 
115 Ibid, 152 
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the wrong or not. This process would take years to have a final decision, and in 1956, they                  
decided that her initial expulsion should stand. Khatijah would go on to join the Pan-Malayan               
Islamic Party (PAS). Her autobiography focuses little on this part of her life. 
 
 
Conclusion 
Khatijah's expulsion from UMNO offers many lessons. First, the male dominance in            
UMNO was strong yet subtle. It rarely expressed itself openly, but instead manifested in quiet               
omitting of people's names from ballots, in snarky faces at the back of the assembly hall, and                 
even in a 'quiet' expulsion from a political party. Khatijah was always an aggressive leader with                
radical tactics, but had it been a man in her place, there is no doubt that he would have been                    
allowed to stay on in UMNO.  
In this chapter, I have laid out the history of Malay politics in the 1940s and presented a                  
case study of a radical approach to women's rights. This approach was met with equally               
aggressive, though much more hidden, maneuvers to remove Khatijah Sidek from her elected             
position. In the next chapter, I will discuss the radical side of Malay politics and the two women                  
involved in AWAS, Tan Sri Aishah Ghani and Shamsiah Fakeh. Before presenting their case              
studies, however, I will start with a deeper look into the KMM and its successor the PKMM, the                  
two early radical Malay political organizations.  
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Chapter 3: The Formation of the Malay Nationalist Party and the Radically Divergent 
Case Studies of Tan Sri Aishah Ghani and Shamsiah Fakeh  
 
Introduction: From KMM to PKMM 
In this chapter, I will take a deeper look at the radical parties that existed in the late 1930s                   
and early 1940s. The emphasis will be on the KMM and the PKMM, two very strong radical                 
parties that unfortunately did not enjoy much popular support. I will then look into PKMM's               
women's wing, AWAS, to analyze how radical actors (both PKMM and AWAS) operated with              
very little funding and support. I will close the chapter analyzing two leaders of AWAS, Tan Sri                 
Aishah Ghani and Shamsiah Fakeh. This chapter hopes to reveal the diverse membership that              
radical parties in this period attracted. There was a general feeling of the need for unity or a                  
national identity that many Malays had but did not know where and how to express it. These                 
early Malay parties were therefore also a breeding ground for different kinds of activism. As we                
shall see, it is very bizarre to find Aishah Ghani and Shamsiah Fakeh leading the same                
organization even if their leaderships were at different times. The last section in this chapter               
deals greatly with that specifically, but also with the political atmosphere at the time that allowed                
these parties to start and compete.  
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Angkatan Wanita Sedar (AWAS), likely the first ever national political organization of            
Malay women, was established in 1945, soon after the Japanese occupation of Malaya ended. It               
began as a women’s wing of the Malay Nationalist Party (MNP, Partai Kebangsaan Melayu              
Malaya, PKMM in Malay) which Aljunied argues was the first truly national and political Malay               
organization. Angkatan Pemuda Insaf (Movement of Enlightened Youth, API) was also formed            
as the youth wing of the PKMM. While Malay organizations had been developing over the past                
few decades in specific states, none of them had national political goals. Take, for example, the                
Persaudaraan Sahabat Pena Malaya ​(PASPAM, Brotherhood of Pen Friends in Malaya,           
founded in 1934) or even the Kesatuan Melayu Singapura (Union of Singapore Malays, KMS,              
formed in 1926). Both of these organizations urged Malays to unite (the word ​Kesatuan ​can be                
translated as Union), but neither of these organizations had explicitly national political            
ambitions.  
PASPAM’s goals were three-fold: to encourage writing in Malay; to promote Malay            
history and customs among Malays; and to establish libraries for its members. While             116
PASPAM was significant in being the first national Malay organization, it definitely did not have               
political goals. The KMM, on the other hand, is considered by many to have been the first                 
national political organization for Malays. Aljunied argues that the KMM cannot be described as              
such because it operated in the shadows. Wary of colonial interference, they “öperated in such               
secrecy that its members even avoided publicizing what they really stood for.” To him, this               117
disqualified the KMM from being regarded as truly political. This is unimportant of course, but it                
116  Soh, Byungkuk “From Parochial to National Outlook: Malay Society in Transition 1920-1948” PhD diss. Ohio 
University, 1993 
117 Aljunied, 103 
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does emphasize the novelty of national political organizations established by a people who had              
not yet been able to create a unifying 'Malay' identity to rally around.  118
Much of what these organizations accomplished centered on social critique. While they            
rarely pushed for any concrete political goals, they viewed a parochial and narrow view of the                
Malay identity as a key weakness. This identity, instead of being a wide net to unite Malays,                 
emphasized and ultimately reinforced intra-ethnic differences based on ethnically or          
geographically specific criteria. For example, a '​Mamak ​Malay' would be a descendant of             
Malayanized Muslim Indians unique from Minangkabau Malays with descendants from Sumatra,           
while '​Orang Perak​' referred to the people from the state of Perak, different from '​Orang               
Selangor​' ​or '​Orang Singapura​'. The KMM specifically criticized this attitude as a hindrance to a               
national Malay identity and therefore to a nationalist movement. This was also true of KMS and                
even its national successor, the KMM, founded in 1938. In the previous chapter, I also touched                
on women’s organizations that had goals of uniting women, often of the same race, in doing                
activities together that were considered womanly, such as knitting and cooking. While these             
organizations served their various purposes, and were sometimes extremely popular among their            
members, AWAS, API and their parent party, PKMM, had its own agenda.  
During the Congress of Malays in Ipoh from November 30th until December 3rd 1945,              
the Congress decided to establish the PKMM with eight goals: 
1. Uniting Malays by inculcating a national spirit in the hearts of Malays with the goal of                
uniting Malaya with Indonesia as one big family.  
2. To pursue independence in speech, movement, thought, and in acquiring an education. 
118 Malays were typically unified by smaller identities of which state they were from (Perak Malays vs. Selangor 
Malays) and what specific ethnic differences they had (Mamak Malays vs. Minangkabau Malays) 
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3. Raising the economic position of Malays through entrepreneurship and agriculture so as            
to raise Malay standards of living. 
4. To pursue freedom in agriculture cultivation. Anyone interested in agriculture cultivation           
should be free from paying rent on land and should be free to sell the product of their                  
labor in the free market.  
5. To demand freedom to Malays to set up their own schools, which shall provide free               
education. 
6. To demand the freedom of the press, encouraging a more democratic education, so as to               
raise the standard of Malays in politics and to encourage nationalism among Malays. 
7. The PKMM shall work with other races living in Malaya to create a “Malayan United               
Front” to ensure that an independent Malaya will be peaceful as part of the ‘Melayu               
Raya’. 
8. To support the independence movement in Indonesia.  119
 
Several aspects of this agenda reveal how Malay radicals at the time were shifting their               
strategy. The PKMM did not have vague goals of ‘uniting’ Malays as many of its predecessors                
did, but instead laid out three explicit political goals. They wanted to inculcate Malay              
nationalism, to achieve independence from the British and to work with non-Malays in Malaya              
in doing so, and to unite with Indonesia as one grand Malay nation. Their emphasis on free                 
enterprise (to set up schools, to become entrepreneurs of their own land) is interesting in itself,                
especially given the supposedly Communist tendencies of many of its members, but this deserves              
119 Adam, Ahmat. “Partai Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya.” ​Jebat 28​, 2001, pp. 63–64  
Translations are my own.  
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its own discussion. I will focus on the three political goals above and explore how they relate to                  
previous Malay parties and their performance with Malays. 
Discussing the performance of the PKMM with Malays requires a little more background             
into its formation. Firstly, it can be argued that the PKMM is a direct successor of the KMM.                  
This is not, however, the same as saying that these organizations operated similarly or had               
similar goals. This was not the case. The KMM did not operate in public, instead leveraging on                 
personal connections and one-to-one correspondence, while the PKMM openly expressed their           
political goals. This will be elaborated on as the chapter progresses.  
At its peak, membership of the PKMM and its auxiliary wings was put at 60,000, with                
2,000 of those being women. This is in stark contrast to the KMM which never had membership                 
in quadruple digits. Roff argues that the “KMM possessed neither the skills nor the money               
necessary to extend its organization much beyond Kuala Lumpur ... and that KMM membership              
... seems likely never to have risen beyond a few hundred.” While there is little evidence on                 
membership to suggest otherwise, focusing entirely on membership numbers downplays the           
organization’s significance. The KMM is, after all, the earliest organization advocating Malay            
nationalism and its underground operations show that its success or failure should not be judged               
on by only its membership count.  
Having said that, some blame needs to be assigned to the KMM. One aspect that cannot                
be ignored is that some of their strategies would by definition lower membership registrations.              
One such example is their sole focus on non-aristocratic Malays. The reasons for the KMM               
pursuing this are not that hard to discern. The noble and elite Malays had monopolized               
communal leadership, and has failed to uplift the Malay community socially and economically.             
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However, their sole focus on non-aristocratic Malays also indicates one of two things. Either the               
KMM did not know that Malay aristocrats still had sway over most Malays, or they knew about                 
it but refused to incorporate that knowledge into their strategy.  
Regardless of why they did not incorporate this into their strategy, this emphasis on class               
purity was an important part of radical struggle. This attitude was carried on by the PKMM and                 
its auxiliary wings too, and shall be discussed later. From chapter 2 we know that over the course                  
of the Japanese occupation of Malaya, the relations between the Japanese and the colonized              
soured. This was to the point that the KMM abandoned any hope that the Japanese would grant                 
independence to Malaya and reverted to their ties with Communists and Communist-inclined            
groups. Before the Japanese left Malaya, they would force the KMM underground and induce its               
leaders to work instead toward a new organization.  
 
PKMM Formation 
Some important figures in PKMM's inception are Mokhtaruddin Lasso, Arshad Ashaari,           
Boestamam, and Dr Burhanuddin al-Helmy. The former two were members of the Indonesian             
Communist Party (ICP), while Boestamam is described by Adam as a ‘non-Communist leftist’.            
There is some scholarly consensus that the ICP and their Malayan counterpart, the MCP, had                120
plenty to do with the formation of the PKMM. There is reason to believe that either                
Communist-inclined thinkers or Indonesian nationalists had a lot to gain from the formation of              
the PKMM. First, Malay political figures actually emulated their Indonesian counterparts, and            
this likely had plenty to do with the proposal to merge Indonesia and Malaya. In fact, the name                  
120Ibid, 65 
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Angkatan Wanita Sedar itself mirrored the Indonesian women’s organization ​Isteri Sedar           
(Conscious Women). Besides that, some influence may have come from Dr. Burhanuddin and             
Mokhtaruddin Lasso's roots in Indonesia. It was not the case, however, that all Indonesian              
communists agreed with Melayu Raya. The ideologically purer Communists felt that Melayu            
Raya was too narrow and a focus on International Communism was needed. On the subject of                
Indo-Malayan cooperation, PKMM's ties with Indonesia are undeniable.  
Second, the MCP believed that something had to be done about the Malay animosity              
towards their party and their Chinese neighbors. The Japanese occupation exacerbated this issue             
with each side blaming the other for torture and killings against the other community. The               
Chinese were tortured by the Japanese in the wake of the Sino-Japanese Wars and blamed               
Malays colluding with the Japanese for much of this. The subsequent response by the Malayan               
People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) in arbitrarily rounding up and torturing Malays           
engendered yet more animosity and violence from Malays, leading to a vicious cycle where              
cooperation between the two races seemed impossible. The formation of the PKMM could             
therefore have been a strategy to attract Malays to radical parties or to familiarize Malays with a                 
palatable form of radical struggle.  
The PKMM's ties to communism and to Indonesia would greatly impact their strategy             
and thereby their popularity. Their ties to Indonesia meant that a lot of their strategies were much                 
more aggressive than most Malays were comfortable with. This is particularly in the case of their                
writing and their slogans. One unique aspect of PKMM was that they were using the word                
'freedom', both in their publications and in slogans. This can be seen as indicative of the general                 
unifying theme of radical thinkers: that freedom or independence must come without strings             
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attached. Any alternative was unacceptable. As opposed to much vaguer slogans pushed by             
UMNO and the more conservative Malays like "​Hidup Melayu!​" ​("Long Live the Malays"),             
PKMM's battle cries incorporated the word 'freedom' (​Kemerdekaan can also be translated as             
"Independence"). Their goals of independence and merging with Indonesia were clear.           
Unfortunately for the PKMM, this was a big barrier to their growth.  
During the early years of PKMM's establishment, Malays were still loyal to their Sultans.              
Evidence of this can be seen in the fact that a big reason protests against the Malayan Union took                   
off was because of the proposal to remove almost all political power from state Sultans, save for                 
issues of religion and customs. Using numbers to contextualize this, PKMM's membership may             
have been an impressive 10,000 or so, but a single protest against the MU could attract                
12,000-15,000. The erosion of the power of the Sultanate drove swathes of Malays to protests,               
indicating that Sultans and aristocrats could still determine whether or not a party would gain               
mass popularity among Malays. The Malay aristocracy, however, were never interested in            
helping the PKMM gain support. The chants of 'freedom' coupled with the PKMM's ties to               
communism made the Malay aristocrats nervous that such views could lead to demands for              
equality and then republicanism. They were incentivized to retain the status quo, which meant              
that for the time being, colonialism was necessary. This situation was a testament to the               121
adeptness of British colonial administrators making themselves 'necessary' to the Malays. This            
setup also prevented any chants of 'freedom' or 'independence' something most Malays would not              
go along with. 
121 Aljunied, 111 
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Another reason why the PKMM's strategies failed to garner much Malay support            
followed out of their initial positive view of the Malayan Union. To be sure, this support was                 
"cautious" from the beginning and the support would actually later turn into opposition.             122
However, the early support for the MU deserves analysis. Tan Sri Aishah Ghani, whose story in                
politics I will present as a case study below, remarked in her memoir that in her view, the                  
PKMM supported the MU in the beginning specifically ​because ​of its program to remove or               
curtail the power of the Malay royalty. This argument seems convincing as it is in line with the                  
PKMM vision of a supposedly non-feudal Malay society. Aishah sees the attitude of PKMM              
thinkers as disconnected from the wider Malay society. While working as a journalist for              
PKMM's periodical, she notes that there was a clear difference between general Malay attitudes              
against the MU and that of PKMM members. Other staff members at her office often teased                
people who opposed the MU. She does not provide details about what was being made fun of,                 123
but this attitude clearly left an imprint on her mind and contributed towards her later resignation                
from the party.  
PKMM support for the MU gradually shifted toward opposition for two reasons. Firstly,             
the support for Onn's MPSJ in rallying tens of thousands of Malays at every protest was                
something they could not ignore. Malay opposition to the MU was obvious in the constant               
barrage of opinion pieces in periodicals and in the protests themselves. Continuing to support the               
MU would have been a politically naive strategy. Besides, as more and more information became               
available regarding the policy of the MU, it became clear to PKMM members that it would                
actually not serve any of their interests. Malek, argues that "even though the Malayan Union               
122 Ghani, 25 
123Ibid,. 
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satisfied [PKMM's] quest for the reduction in the power of the aristocracy, it would mean an end                 
to their plans for a unification of Malaya and Sumatra to form a huge maritime republican Malay                 
nation" By the time that MU opposition peaked, Abdullah C.D, a communist stalwart and              124
PKMM leader, said "by this time, the two-faced Malayan Union thought up by the British had                
come very much into question" Knowing that they were on the losing side against the               125
conservative elites, Dr Burhanuddin and Ahmad Boestamam then relied on support to some             
degree from their auxiliary youth and women's wings. I will now take a glance at its women's                 
wing and this will become the main focus of the rest of the chapter. 
The formation of AWAS created significant change for Malay women. Dr. Burhanuddin            
al-Helmy, Chairman of the PKMM at the time, was enthusiastic about the role he envisioned               
women playing in Malay political movement. Some scholars underline the significance of Dr.             
Burhanuddin's decision-making process to have been influenced by his matrilineal Sumatran           
background. He makes no note of this in his own writing, but it is not inconceivable that his                  
lineage sensitized him to the needs of Malay women. What is more likely, however, is that he                 
saw an opportunity to bring a massive demographic, Malay women, under PKMM influence, and              
he wanted AWAS to operate as its vehicle. As Aljunied puts it, “[AWAS’s] male creators               
regarded it as useful only to the extent that it would help bolster the image and legitimacy of the                   
male leadership.” It might be useful to add here that Khatijah Sidek herself throughout her               126
autobiography makes some mention of matrilineality as part of her life, but never attempts to               
grasp whether that had an impact on her thinking.  127
124 Malek, G " The Outcome of the Radical-Conservative Conflict in Modern Malay Politics: The Malayan Union 
Crisis and the Triumph of Conservatism” MA diss. Concordia University, 1993: p. 77 
125Ahmad Boestaman, Carving the Path to the Summit, Ohio University Press, 1979: p. 48 
126 ​Aljunied (2015), 143 
127 Sidek, 166 
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An important theme which it became an interest of the PKMM was ​Malay women              
empowerment. While AWAS developed a uniquely cordial relationship with people of minority            
races, especially during the leadership of Shamsiah Fakeh, its focus from the beginning was to               
tackle issues Malay women were familiar with. These issues tended to gravitate around early              
marriage and the ease with which women were divorced by their husbands. As we shall see,                
AWAS never became as popular as the Kaum Ibu (Women's Wing) of UMNO. Regardless, the               
support that it did to manage to garner was definitely impressive for its time and limited                
resources. 
Analyzing Malay women’s political strategies presents any researcher with a set of            
challenges. For the female leaders I have chosen, archives of letters, memos, and party              
documents are kept exclusively in Malaysia with no option of digital access. This presents a               
great barrier to anyone doing research in the field without the funds to go back and forth to                  
Malaysia. The main primary documents I will rely on are, therefore, memoirs. Utilizing memoirs              
as a main source of information opens the door to historical figures rewriting history. Differing               
accounts of certain events to the point where analysis becomes extremely difficult or tedious              
presents problems for any researcher. However, what I am able to do is cross-reference different               
memoirs’ description of one particular event to see if there are discrepancies in the telling of the                 
event. These issues will be addressed on a case-by-case basis, evaluating each memoir’s             
reliability as a source. I will now present two case studies on Malay women's political strategies,                
beginning with Tan Sri Aishah Ghani's involvement in AWAS.  
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Tan Sri Aishah Ghani: Life Before Malay Nationalism (1923-1931) 
Tan Sri Aishah Ghani leaves a legacy as one of the most important Malay women in                
Malay politics and history. Malaysian media magnate Johan Jaafar, writing his obituary for the              
late Aishah in 2009, titled his article “The Dedication of Tan Sri Aishah Ghani”. In it, he                 128
describes meeting her on several occasions and being impressed with how “sharp” she was. In               
other articles on Aishah’s legacy, she is described as “formidable” , as a “trailblazer” and as               129
“​The grand old dame of Malay politics”. Perhaps important for our case study here, it is                130
reassuring that all three of these articles tell its readers that one of her strongest assets was her                  
incredible memory, being able to ​“conjure names and dates 70 years ago out of thin air with little                  
more than a momentary glance upwards to put things in perspective.” This is also evident in her                 
autobiography when she describes events with the full names of every single individual present.              
It is clear that regardless of how she was perceived, her legacy is one of admiration and                 
pioneership.  
Tan Sri Aishah Ghani was born in 1923 in Ulu Langat, Selangor. The entire beginning of                
her autobiography is focused not on her family or her political achievements, but on the               
expectations placed on young girls during her childhood. She is thankful to have had parents               
willing to send her to school, knowing other parents may not have wanted their daughters to be                 
educated or even literate, for fear that they then start "writing love letters to boys". Her parents                 
128 ​Jaaffar, J. (2013, Apr 27). The dedication of Tan Sri Aishah Ghani.​ New Straits Times ​Retrieved from 
http://proxy.lib.umich.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/1346505298?accountid=14667 
129 ​Othman, Z. (2013, Apr 21). Meeting the formidable aishah.​ New Straits Times ​Retrieved from 
http://proxy.lib.umich.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/1330996820?accountid=14667 
130 Moses, B. "Aishah, a true trailblazer in life and politics." ​New Straits Times​, 20 Apr. 2013, p. 008. ​Infotrac 
Newsstand​, 
http://link.galegroup.com/apps/doc/A443813249/STND?u=lom_umichanna&sid=STND&xid=613e7bd3. Accessed 
5 Mar. 2018. 
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also granted her more freedom than others, with her friends not being allowed to befriend boys                
once they reach the age of 10. This emphasis on education is made throughout the chapter on her                  
early life and underlines how significant Tan Sri Aishah Ghani believed education to be in her                
life. 
While her parents had views on education that she agreed with, the same cannot be said                
of their views on marriage. Recalling an incident when she was eleven years old, she saw her                 
mother purchasing wedding necessities which she assumed were for her. Knowing that her             
parents did not view early marriage the same way she did, she desperately tried to get out of the                   
marriage. Friends who had been married at comparably young ages told her about the ‘fear and                
anxiety’ that follows. This is likely related to rampant domestic abuse at the time and the                
insecurity felt as they could have easily been divorced at any time. As was noted in chapter 1,                  
women enjoy very little security in marriages, and husbands can divorce their wives by simply               
uttering the phrase "I divorce you". She also knew that if she accepted her parents’ intentions to                 
marry her off, her education would be subject to her husband’s approval, something she felt she                
was unlikely to get. In her own words, this is how she described the way she objected to her                   
parents: 
“‘No, no!... This time I must rebel!’ This was the urgency I felt within me, to be brave                  
and to fight against society’s expectations of women that place absolutely no hope that they will                
achieve anything… like a thunderstorm splitting the Earth in two, I screamed with all my heart in                 
protest while throwing around all items my mother had bought… I [also] went on a hunger strike                 
for several days”.   131
131 Ghani, Aishah. ​Memoir Seorang Pejuang​. Dewan Bahasa Dan Pustaka, Kementerian Pendidikan Malaysia, 1992. 
P. 5 
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She would travel to her school in Indonesia with her father not long later. 
This is a good place to pause our discussion of Aishah as a leader and evaluate her                 
autobiography’s authenticity. Firstly, it is very possible that Aishah decided to exaggerate how             
much she did not want to get married, given that at the time of writing her autobiography in the                   
late 1980s and early 1990s, women’s education was firmly established among Malaysians. It is              
impossible to be sure, but what makes it seem convincing is that throughout the autobiography,               
Aishah makes little attempt to either paint her parents in a more flattering light or make herself                 
out to be more obedient to her parents than she was. Besides that, there is also an emphasis on                   
her part in seeing a female Malay teacher named Kontik Kamariah, driving to her school in a red                  
sports car. Cik Kontik is a largely unknown figure, though she and Aishah likely met each other                 
while both later being a part of UMNO’s women’s wing, ​Kaum Ibu​. The impact of being a                 
teacher and bossing around male teachers at Aishah’s school left a young Aishah thinking to               
herself, “If Cik Kontik can become a teacher, drive a red sports car and give instructions to my                  
school principal who is a male, then society is wrong in thinking women can only become                
housekeepers.” This story is repeated in at least two other interviews of Aishah’s, which              132
indicates that the story might have actually had the impact she claimed in her autobiography. The                
consistency in her stories and the lack of disputes regarding family portrayals, along with the               
aforementioned praise of the strength of her memory, indicate that the book should be a reliable                
source. 
Coming back to the story of Cik Kontik, Aishah says that her school principal informed               
her that Cik Kontik was successful because of her English-language education. When a visiting              
132 Ghani, 4. 
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teacher came to invite young girls to enrol in English-language vernacular schools, Aishah was              
barred from going by her father. Her father apparently held the still-popular belief that enrolling               
in English-language schools would “bring with it many sins” (​membawa banyak dosa​). At the              
time, many Malay parents believed that educating their daughters would directly lead to more              
sinful acts, something Tan Sri Aishah Ghani herself touches on. In fact, she says that one reason                 
her parents were not too keen on educating her was that literacy meant that she could “write love                  
letters to boys” and this would in turn lead to sinful acts. She acquiesced with not being allowed                  
to enrol in an English-language school but only after her brother convinced their parents to send                
her to study in a prestigious religious school in Indonesia called Diniyah Puteri instead.  133
Her education in Indonesia is significant. Unlike schools in Malaya, especially those            
operated by British officers or expats which focused on getting Malays trained for mid-to-lower              
level positions in the colonial bureaucracy, schools in Indonesia, while also teaching the basic              
subjects like math and religious studies, emphasized teaching about colonialism too. Aishah            
herself notes how it was at this school that she “began to realize that every colonized race must                  
fight to free themselves from the clutches of colonizers” Interestingly, Shamsiah Fakeh, who I              134
will talk about later in this chapter, enrolled in the same school at the same time as Aishah. They                   
were two out of three people from Peninsular Malaya to be in that school, the other being                 
Sakinah Juned. It is worth mentioning that all three women became prominent figures in Malay               
politics.  
After finishing her studies in ​Diniyah Puteri​, Aishah continued her studies in Sumatra in              
a Teacher’s College. She notes that apart from many being educated in Dutch schools, her               
133 Johan Jaafar describes this school as “legendary”. 
134 Ghani, 9 
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teachers were mainly made up of graduates from al-Azhar University in Egypt, the same              
university which churned out many scholars of the Kaum Muda or Young Bloc mentioned in               
chapter 1. Her studies were disrupted by Japanese attacks on Indonesia in 1941, but she managed                
to graduate and returned to Malaya after enduring great struggles. After World War II, her dream                
of becoming a journalist came true when she was offered to work at ​Pelita Malaya​, a prominent                 
Malay-language newspaper.  
 
Tan Sri Aishah Ghani: In-And-Out as AWAS Leader 
Tan Sri Aishah Ghani was enthusiastic during her appointment as the leader of the              
nascent political organization, AWAS. Under her leadership, the organization "gained visibility           
and momentum” , with a reported membership of 610 at the time of her departure. To put                135
things into context, the KMM before them never had membership exceeding triple digits, though              
AWAS membership seems to have been dwarfed by that of API which had 2,560 members.               136
Regardless, her ability to court that many Malay women into AWAS is impressive.  
Her contact with Dr Burhanuddin and Ahmad Boestamam began when she was hired in              
1945 as a journalist for ​Pelita Malaya​, a publication which served as the mouthpiece of PKMM.                
Her excitement at getting a job in Kuala Lumpur with her own pay (especially wages not                
denominated in the hyperinflated Japanese '​duit pisang' ​currency ​at the time) and in the field of                
journalism, which she desperately sought to enter, was written clearly in her memoir. At the very                
outset, her connections with Dr Burhanuddin and Boestamam was not based on ideological             
sympathy, but interest in writing. Her passion in her work did not go unnoticed, and before long,                 
135 Aljunied, 146 
136 ​Soh, 328 
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Dr Burhanuddin asked her lead the new women's wing he was forming. Not knowing about               
PKMM's Communist inclinations at the time, she enthusiastically accepted the offer. Her job was              
clear to her: get Malay women to join AWAS (and therefore PKMM). She would go on various                 
trips to different towns in Malaya to gather support and registrations into AWAS. While the               
party never took off in comparison to later parties protesting the Malayan Union, the numbers               
that they did get were still impressive. 
While she was passionate about her role in AWAS at the time, she would later say in an                  
interview with Dancz that "the MNP was only interested in women for political reasons, to add                
strength to the party in order to push for independence. Women's issues as such did not exist in                  
1946." This statement echoes Aishah's disappointment and the reasons she left AWAS. The             137
Communist tendencies of the PKMM started to become clear to Aishah the more she worked               
there, to her disarray. During the fourteen-day interregnum when the Malayan People's            
Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) filled a political vacuum vacated by Japanese surrender, the            
largely Chinese organization went around villages murdering and torturing Malays suspected of            
having collaborated with the Japanese colonial administration. Her neighbor, who she claims was             
innocent, was brutally tortured and murdered at the hands of the MPAJA. The averseness of so                
many Malays to Communism was already apparent with their strong ties to Islam, but this period                
heightened that intense hatred of Communism and Communist-sympathizers. It is therefore           
understandable that when she saw Abdullah C.D, then a PKMM member, write on the              
blackboard "Communism, Our Protector" ("​Komunisme, Engkau Pembela Kita​"), she began to           
feel anxious about being a part of the PKMM. It was not helpful that when she shared her                  
137 ​Dancz, 86 
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misgivings with Abdullah C.D. and other PKMM leaders, their reply was always along the lines               
of "[Our ​big plan​] is still a secret that we can't divulge yet, because you haven't been with us for                    
long… We will tell you two years from now." The tendencies of the PKMM members became                138
clear when she was made to attend a lecture on the Bolshevik revolution. Even if the PKMM was                  
not Communist, Aishah did not believe in armed revolution in general. This is exposed in her                
discussion with Abdullah C.D. about whether armed revolution is needed. Aishah obviously            
argued against it, stating that the loss of life would be devastating. 
At the time of her resignation, UMNO had formed, but the PKMM withdrew from the               
coalition because of UMNO's refusal to use the '​Sang Saka Merah Putih' as its official flag,                
which was a symbol of unity between Indonesia and Malaya. To Aishah, UMNO was more               
"sincere and pure" in their political goals. This presence of an alternative party to the PKMM,                
and especially one as popular as it was, would definitely have been a part of Aishah's decision                 
not to continue with the PKMM. After less than a year as AWAS leader, Aishah tendered her                 
resignation. When asked by Dr Burhanuddin why she did so, she told him that she intended to                 
get married and build a family. This was likely a contributing factor, but several other factors                
were more important in driving her decision. Tan Sri Aishah Ghani and the pioneers of Malay                
women's political activism in AWAS were disenchanted by the radicalism of PKMM. Before             
officially resigning, however, Aishah was asked to suggest a replacement. She would suggest             
someone who she had "known well" during their time in ​Diniyah Puteri ​together. 
 
 
138 ​Ghani, 20. The phrase 'big plan' was not translated.  
 
83 
 Aishah Ghani and Khatijah Sidek: Narratives on the Expulsion 
Aishah would later go on to further her studies in journalism in London and join UMNO's                
KI upon her return. She was in the KI at the same time that Khatijah Sidek was, though Aishah                   139
was lower down the hierarchy than Khatijah. In fact, comparing the two women's descriptions on               
Khatijah's expulsion from the KI expose the differences in how the two see that same moment. I                 
have already provided Khatijah's accounts in chapter 2, this section will focus on Aishah's              
account of the same event. In terms of her general description of Khatijah, it is one of praise for a                    
powerful orator and talented politician. She heaps praise on her "pure" principles and how              
adamant she was in following those principles.  140
However, she does not heap much praise when she is describing the expulsion. Calling              
her approach "quite radical", Aishah, like the other men in UMNO, saw Khatijah as a               
disturbance, though she is careful in her wording to appear much more amicable. Her account of                
Khatijah's expulsion does mention the disappointment Khatijah had at not being fielded to             
challenge a parliamentary seat but does not make much of it. The feeling that Aishah's narrative                
gives us is that the ends do not justify the means, most explicitly when she calls Khatijah a '​duri                   
dalam daging'​.   141
I'd specifically like to emphasize the phrase "​Duri dalam daging"​, which literally means             
'a thorn in the meat'. It refers to something that causes unease or unrest. Using it in relation to                   
Khatijah's demands, she is saying that Khatijah need not cause disruption. Just to remind the               
reader, Khatijah's demands were in no way excessive. Having disciplined the KI into a              
139 The Tunku had personally invited her to join UMNO even before she started studying in London. 
140 ​Ghani, 89 
141 ​Ghani, 90 
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formidable political force, she wanted more representation for KI at UMNO meetings and more              
women to be fielded in elections. For a lot of the other women, that low level disruption as a                   
response to being ignored made sense. This did not apply to the men who intended to oust her                  142
or to Aishah Ghani herself. To Aishah, Khatijah's expulsion was justified. She makes no mention               
of the way the expulsion was done or the fact that Khatijah was not informed about it by an                   
UMNO member but by a newspaper in Indonesia. She makes no attempt to think about the fact                 
that UMNO's General Secretary, Mohammad Yasin bin Abdul Rahman, openly questioned           
Khatijah's appointment at a party meeting. She instead presents the entire event as an UMNO               
member would do so, citing official party reasoning as the main cause of the expulsion. 
Aishah's caution (and conservatism) is seen throughout her political career. She quits            
PKMM once she gets nervous about their revolutionary communist slant. She joins UMNO, but              
only after furthering her studies, meaning that she at least felt that UMNO's cause could be put                 
on hold for her to develop more as an individual. She would slowly but surely rise up the ranks                   
in UMNO and become the ​Ketua ​herself from 1972 to 1984. She would also become a cabinet                 
minister from 1973 to 1984.   143
 
Shamsiah Fakeh: Early Life (1924-1945) 
Shamsiah Fakeh does not enjoy the prestige and respect that Tan Sri Aishah Ghani's              
legacy evoked. Similar to most leftist Malay figures, this translated into a certain invisibility in               
history textbooks. This has led to some scholars producing papers “reappraising” the roles of              
leftists in this period, as most simply focus on UMNO’s role and little else, even though UMNO                 
142 Some Kaum Ibu branches threatened to leave UMNO if Khatijah was not allowed back into UMNO. 
143 “Tan Sri Aishah Ghani.” ​Wanita UMNO​, 10 May 2012, www.wanitaumno.my/5-tan-sri-aishah-ghani/. 
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formed only in 1946. Interestingly, however, there is a novel about Shamsiah Fakeh based on her                
own autobiography. I have not been able to get access to the full novel, but many parts of the                   
novel portray Shamsiah’s communist tendencies as merely a symptom of her staunch            
anti-colonial philosophy and militancy. This would allow the novel to paint Shamsiah’s            
strategies as merely a form of anti-colonial protest, while ignoring the anti-religious aspect of              
Communism.  
While Aishah's life was not easy, Shamsiah’s was nothing short of tragic. Born into              
poverty in 1924, one of her earliest memories of her father was his being arrested by British                 
officials for selling goods on a sidewalk without a license. Her father was a petty trader selling                 
vegetables or fish and homemade medicines while her mother sold clothes to other villagers.              
Both parents often came home empty handed. A life of poverty was only interrupted when her                
father enrolled her in a religious boarding school. Shamsiah does not mention her time in               
Diniyah Puteri​, where Tan Sri Aishah Ghani went to school at the same time as her. However,                 
Aishah's account seems reliable as Shamsiah herself acknowledges that she had known Aishah             
for a long time at the time she wrote her memoirs. Describing her return to Malaysia from                 
eventual political exile (for supposedly being a Communist), she says that Aishah was one of               
only two people who greeted her warmly, letting Shamsiah call Aishah simply as 'Kak Aishah',               
even though Tan Sri Aishah Ghani had at that time received the honorary title of 'Tan Sri', the                  
second highest honor in Malaysia. Aishah apparently gave Shamsiah some money, seeing that             144
she was struggling financially upon returning. The school that Shamsiah does mention several             
times is ​Sekolah Agama Rahmah al-Yunusiah in Padang Panjang, Indonesia. From the beginning,             
144 'Kak' is short for 'Kakak', meaning older sister in Malay. It is a friendly prefix for slightly older women in 
general. 
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it was clear to a young Shamsiah that the school she was enrolled in "taught and inculcated a                  
nationalist spirit among Indonesian youths." Clearly, she agrees that schooling in Indonesia            145
changed something within her.   
An important part of Shamsiah’s life story is her first two marriages, both ending in               
divorce. Her first marriage was to Yasin Kina, the son of wealthy Indonesian farmers. She argues                
that the religious leader of her place of study in Sumatra, Lebai Maadah, “encouraged and               
arranged” the marriage as a way to extend his personal connections with Yasin Kina’s family, in                
the hopes that it would benefit his school financially. She lamented that Yasin Kina was far too                 146
reliant on his parents’ wealth that he did not have a job, leading to the worry that he would not be                     
able to sustain a family. Yasin Kina would get a modest sum of money from his parents and give                   
very little to his wife and child. The couple had two children, both of whom died early due to                   
malnutrition. When Shamsiah was eight months into her second pregnancy, Yasin Kina divorced             
her without her knowledge. According to Shamsiah's father, Yasin Kina presented him with a              
letter stating his intention to divorce Shamsiah, and did not provide any explanations.             
Apparently, he simply "left after giving the letter", and then remarried a woman from his village.               
Because Yasin presented a written form of a statement of divorce to a ​wali, ​the father or                  147
grandfather, this divorce was considered valid. Her second marriage was not as traumatic, but              148
still did not give her much happiness. After some discussions with a mysterious J.M. Rusdi,               
Shamsiah and her parents accepted his proposal for marriage. Her parents liked that he was from                
Sumatra (the same place where her father originated), while she liked that Rusdi accepted her               
145 ​Shamsiah Fakeh, 18 
146 Ibid, 19 
147 Ibid, 21 
148 ​The wali are men who are allowed to take care of marital issues for certain women. These women are typically 
one's daughter or granddaughter.  
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only requirement to get married: that she be allowed to further her studies during the marriage.                
After marrying him, Shamsiah rarely saw her new husband. As he rarely came home, she               
decided to further her studies. Her studies would be disrupted when after only five months of                
marriage, Rusdi decided to divorce her, writing to Shamsiah to skip a few classes and meet him                 
in Kuala Pilah. Though he carried out the divorce much more amicably, meeting Shamsiah and               
her parents in person, he still did not provide much explanation. She would later learn that Rusdi                 
was a womanizer and an informant to the Japanese.  
Determining whether Shamsiah's memoirs are reliable is more difficult than those of Tan             
Sri Aishah Ghani's. Firstly, most of her memoirs recount events that are difficult to              
cross-examine. Very few of the Communist leaders published memoirs, and this is problematic             
when there are discrepancies in descriptions of events. Ting argues that Shamsiah's description             
of her father was different from that of Fatini, a Malaysian journalist in the 1980s who wrote a                  
series on Shamsiah's legacy. Access to this series of articles is, unfortunately, unavailable             
digitally. Ting also discusses how Shamsiah's failed third marriage to Communist leader            
Abdullah C.D had produced different interpretations from different people. Let us now take a              
glance at how it is Shamsiah Fakeh and Tan Sri Aishah Ghani came close to each other                 
politically, indeed becoming leaders of the same political group.  
Firstly, both of these women felt strongly about women's issues. Shamsiah was likely             
informed by her tragic past of oppression by male partners and religious teachers, while Aishah               
was repeatedly enraged by Malay society's narrow views of women as housekeepers and cooks.              
The establishment of a political organization specifically for Malay women would therefore            
attract both women, even if that organization was merely an auxiliary to the PKMM. Secondly,               
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their education in Indonesian is something that cannot be ignored. Religious schools in Indonesia              
differed from most in Malaya in that the former emphasized nationalism in the classroom. This               
early sensitization to nationalism would no doubt have had an impact on Malay girls enrolled in                
these schools. It is no coincidence that Shamsiah Fakeh, Sakinah Juned, and Shamsiah Fakeh all               
went to the same school and would become massively important politicians. It is also no               
coincidence that Khatijah Sidek, whom I discussed in chapter 2, actually originated from             
Indonesia. A separate study showcasing the impact of Indonesian-educated women in Malay            
peninsular politics would be insightful.  
 
Shamsiah Fakeh: Malay Female Political Issues Embodied 
After Tan Sri Aishah Ghani's short stint as AWAS leader, Shamsiah Fakeh, just 21 years               
of age at the time, replaced her with great enthusiasm from PKMM leaders. It is strange that                 
Shamsiah decided to omit completely from her memoir Aishah's role in her joining PKMM. This               
is especially true in that Aishah not only travelled over sixty miles from Kuala Lumpur to Kuala                 
Pilah to meet Shamsiah to offer her the position, but also purchased Shamsiah her first pair of                 
work shoes. Shamsiah was so poor that she did not have any. From a research perspective, this                 
might simply boil down to priorities in story-telling. While Tan Sri Aishah Ghani's focus in her                
autobiography was to provide detailed accounts of events, Shamsiah's autobiography reads more            
like a novel, where the emphasis placed on events is much more in line with a grand narrative.                  
This just underlines the different approaches these women took in telling the same story and goes                
to show how they thought about them.  
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At the time she received her offer, Shamsiah was well aware of the difference in strategy                
between UMNO and PKMM. According to her, she believed UMNO to be far too soft against                
the British, and UMNO's willingness to work with the British was to her unacceptable. Any               
independence negotiated with the British would by definition have strings attached to it. 
Aishah's motives in nominating Shamsiah for the position deserves some discussion.           
Aishah herself does not say much about her decision, only that she knew Shamsiah well from                
school. But this is not likely to have been a major factor in her decision. AWAS at the time had                    
hundreds of members in several branches across Malaya. She believed in Shamsiah's character,             
telling other PKMM members, "Shamsiah is strong. She can go far." Aljunied claims she              149
chose Shamsiah because she was the "embodiment of the plight of many Malay women of her                
time, especially in the realms of marriage and divorce." This seems like a far more plausible                150
argument, given that Aishah knew her well and possibly knew of her past marriages. This               
indicates that Aishah emphasized these aspects as a significant part of Malay women's political              
activism. Young Malay women were often married off at seventeen or younger, something both              
Aishah and Shamsiah were well aware of, with Aishah able to escape it likely only because she                 
was her parents' favorite child. The goals of AWAS under her were, after all:  
(1) the unity of Malay women for Malay independence;  
(2) abolition of conservative customs regarding the social position of Malay women;  
(3) abolition of forced marriage;  
(4) support of API; and 
(5) the formation of Red Cross units. 
149 Ghani, 32 
150Aljunied, 150 
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Nominating a leader who was not only a fiery orator, but had personally experienced              
misogynist oppression in an area that was significant specifically to Malay women seems a more               
plausible motive than just mere acquaintance. This translated into political rhetoric when            
Shamsiah proclaimed at the API's first congress that "AWAS and API will both struggle for               
independence through blood. A youth will not be permitted to marry an AWAS girl unless he is                 
prepared to sacrifice his life for independence" While this quote does not directly discuss early               151
marriage, it addresses the issue of 'useless husbands', a common complaint of Malay women at               
the time.  
The case of Tan Sri Aishah Ghani nominating Shamsiah Fakeh is one that underlines              
Aishah's conservative strategy. While she herself clearly acknowledges the need for radical            
activism among women, i.e, for women to directly confront masculinity, she was not willing or               
not able to herself be a part of it. If she did not believe in this necessity, it is difficult to argue                      
that she would have nominated Shamsiah in the first place, given that she mentioned knowing of                
Shamsiah's political radicalism in her autobiography.  
When she did leave, many of the pioneering batch of AWAS leaders resigned along with               
Aishah. This gave Shamsiah plenty of freedom to choose her workforce. She appointed several              
new leaders to different branches of AWAS across Malaya, one of whom was no other than                
Sakinah Juned, who went to school with Aishah and Shamsiah in ​Diniyah Puteri​. Aljunied points               
out two main commonalities between Shamsiah and this new batch of AWAS leaders. First, they               
were all extraordinarily young, none above the age of twenty-five, and with almost no              
organizational experience. Second, the new group were mostly urban Malay women. Their            
151 Soh, 339-340. Emphasis my own.  
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urbanization likely reveals the areas in which women were most sensitized to political             
developments through new opportunities for employment and political interaction. Aljunied          
notes that though these women were from urban areas, they were definitely not disconnected              
from rural Malays.  
Shamsiah would go on to make several changes she felt necessary to AWAS's strategy.              
Primarily, she believed that AWAS needed to stop operating as an auxiliary organization and              
become more independent. In terms of financing, AWAS members were known to ask for small               
donations of ten cents from villages or in the form of cups of rice. Some members even pawned                  
their jewelry in order to gain funds for party operations. Clearly, these women were extremely               152
passionate about their cause, and would not let money become a barrier. Some villagers observed               
that many AWAS and API members would work together cultivating rice and sell their product               
to help sustain their organizations. AWAS hosted communal activities, lectures on several            153
issues, and prayed at the mosque together with the men. Their work not only served AWAS                154
and PKMM, but Malay women in general given that they were contributing to dismantling of               
gender stereotypes. 
The increasing radicalism of AWAS under Shamsiah Fakeh was clear. Cries for militant             
opposition against the British in alliance with international Communist movements would shift            
AWAS even further leftward. This would eventually lead to the banning of AWAS by the British                
colonial administration during the Malayan Emergency, which was declared in 1948 following            
increasing tensions between the British and Communists. Little else is known about AWAS,             
152Aljunied,152 
153 Khoo, Agnes, and Richard Crisp. ​Life as the River Flows: Women in the Malayan Anti-Colonial Struggle: an 
Oral History of Women from Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore​. Merlin Press, 2004. p. 208 
154 Women praying along with men was not common, but not unheard of either.  
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something Aljunied himself concedes. Even Shamsiah Fakeh, in her autobiography, does not go             
into much detail regarding AWAS and its operations, focusing primarily instead on her struggles              
in the Malayan jungles with the Malayan Communist Party's 10th Regiment, formed specifically             
to get Malays to join the MCP.  
 
Lessons From Malay Women's Political Leaders 
Unfortunately, AWAS did not survive British repression during the Emergency. Radical           
members were imprisoned or joined the Communists deep in the Malayan jungles. Their less              
radical counterparts joined other political parties like UMNO and the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party             
(PAS). Analysis of the strategies of its two earliest leaders shows several key patterns. First, the                
period before the Malayan Union was one in which PKMM dominated Malay politics, with few               
other alternatives for those who were politically active. It is likely that their reluctance to               
announce their Communist inclinations and especially the Communist involvement in PKMM's           
founding was part of their strategy to attract people from all walks of life. This was in line with                   
Dr Burhanuddin's own strategy to synthesize a coherent Islamo-Socialist Nationalism, but even            
beyond that, it was part of what PKMM learned from their predecessor, the KMM. The KMM                
only targeted non-aristocratic Malays, but PKMM leadership felt that policy excluded so many             
politically-aware aristocrats, not to mention peasants still loyal to the noble Malays. This lack of               
an alternative helps explain how a Communist Shamsiah Fakeh can be in the same woman's               
organization as the revolution-averse Tan Sri Aishah Ghani. Had the Kaum Ibu UMNO been in               
existence much earlier, it is likely that the two would not have led the same organization.  
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Second, the two case studies I have presented in this chapter showcase two radically              
competing strategies for empowering women, which also happened to be a microcosm of the              
competition between two different strategies of UMNO and PKMM in achieving independence            
or 'freedom'. This is especially interesting when we take Khatijah Sidek's expulsion from UMNO              
into account, discussed in chapter 2. Her strategies were radical, but she decided to operate in                
UMNO, a clearly conservative party. Her decision is also likely due to lack of alternatives, given                
that AWAS had collapsed by the time Khatijah joined UMNO. However, her story tells us that                
women's strategies did not necessarily correspond with party membership. These case studies            
highlight the simple and shallow analysis of UMNO as homogeneously conservative and the             
PKMM as similarly radical. A radical Khatijah would try to lead a conservative UMNO, while a                
conservative Tan Sri Aishah Ghani would lead AWAS. These two examples ended with             
expulsion on the one hand and disillusionment and resignation on the other. Khatijah would push               
every single boundary not violated by women before her. She would challenge the hegemony of               
male dominance in UMNO and was met with fierce opposition. Compare this with strategies of               
other women in UMNO, Ibu Zain for example, the Kaum Ibu leader before Khatijah Sidek. She                
was willing to work within UMNO, even if that meant tacitly accepting the unquestionable              
authority men had. It was clear that men were the party's leaders and that whatever Dato' Onn,                 
then UMNO President, said would be honored. She knew this and utilized it to her advantage.                
Instead of challenging that dominance, she sought to persuade Onn that women's suffrage should              
be a part of any new Malay nation. Onn's support proved vital and the right to vote for women                   
has been enshrined in Malaysia's history ever since its establishment in 1957.  
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Conclusion 
In the early chapters, we have seen the numerous issues that plagued the Malay mind in                
the early twentieth century. Hopefully, this paper underlines the additional issues that plagued             
the mind of Malay ​women ​specifically. In education, this paper discussed not just the barrier to                
young girls faced, but the barrier older Malay women also faced from early marriage. Even when                
these women did get an education, economic prospects were never plentiful. Male anxiety over              
women overtaking them in the economy framed the entire discussion, even something as             
seemingly simple as educating young girls. In marriage, women were often insecure. Their             
marriage could be easily cancelled by their husbands and division of wealth between divorcees              
was rarely even. This is not to mention how prevalent domestic violence was. Take Atom, a                
Malay woman who joined the Communist Party in her 20s. Domestic violence tragically             
followed her throughout her life. In her own words, "life changed after marriage. My father no                
longer beat me… Although my father stopped beating me, my husband beat me instead. It was                
just as bad. My husband was no good to me either."   155
Given all these barriers, it is impressive then that AWAS and the KI were formed at all.                  
So it is no surprise that when we look at the history of these two organizations, discussions were                  
still framed by male anxiety. In the case of UMNO, female leaders were expelled and allocations                
of seats for women in party assemblies remained low, even when the KI was vital to UMNO in                  
155 ​Khoo (2004), p. 36 
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elections. These systematic barriers framed the minds of Malay women in politics. The question              
was then whether to directly confront that barrier or to use it. This is where our discussion on the                   
three women comes in. In the final chapter, I have discussed the competing strategies of dealing                
with masculine power. Tan Sri Aishah Ghani practiced the pragmatic approach of accepting male              
dominance as a given and to advance the women's cause bearing that fact in mind. These women                 
did not make it their goal to agitate male power or to confront it, but likely saw that as secondary                    
to either rising up the ranks or to furthering women's empowerment.  
This was in stark contrast to the strategy employed by Shamsiah Fakeh and Khatijah              
Sidek, who practiced radical activism. They directly confronted male superiority. In the case of              
Khatijah, she organized the Kaum Ibu very well and made demands from the men to give some                 
acknowledgement of the women's contributions to the party. In Shamsiah's case, masculinity was             
directly confronted at every stage of her political life. She would fight the men in UMNO and the                  
men in the British colonial administration and would fight for her vision of freedom in the                
jungles of Malaya. 
Hopefully, this paper has shed light on a strand of Malayan political history that is rarely                
discussed. This paper made no attempt to decipher which among the women had the most               
successful strategies as this would require more research. Regardless, men and women from both              
the conservative and radical sides were instrumental in moulding the the nation that would form.               
These men and women who gave their careers, wealth, time, energy, and relationships away              
deserve to have their stories heard. To quote Khatijah Sidek herself, "If I have sacrificed this                
much for my country, this country should then make an effort to know about my struggles".  156
156 ​Ghani, 89 
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